A/HRC/22/47 on activities which should be discussed by the legislature, made public and disseminated by all necessary means. Appropriate provisions should be made in order to allow effective implementation and follow-up to the recommendations made by national institutions. 2. Autonomy from Government and independence 46. National institutions should be able to work independently, without interference of any sort from the authorities or other branches of the State. In this connection, the Paris Principles and the general observations of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation provide substantive guidance on how to strengthen the organizational and operational structure of institutions with the aim of ensuring their autonomy and independence. 47. The criteria and processes for nomination, appointment and security of tenure of the members of the governing bodies of these institutions should be established and controlled by Parliament. They should ensure an open and transparent process for nomination and appointment. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation has indicated that the participation of members of Government in national institutions should be limited to an advisory capacity and that no secondments of civil servants should be allowed. Tenure should be secure and dismissal only possible in exceptional and clearly defined circumstances. 48. The participation of civil society, including defenders, and other relevant stakeholders in the nomination and appointment process is also considered essential in order to ensure independence and autonomy. This is the case in various countries and national institutions, which positively affects the degree of pluralism of the institutions and enhances their credibility. In this connection, through the responses to her questionnaire, the Special Rapporteur has identified various examples of good practices in relation to the criteria and process of nomination and appointment of members of governing bodies of national institutions. 49. For example, the position of Commissioner of the national institution in Canada is widely advertised when vacant, and anyone can apply. In Uruguay, the law establishes that the members of the national institution can be nominated by NGOs, which is also widely the case in practice. In New Zealand, the criteria for appointment of Commissioners are clearly established in the regulatory framework and groups and individuals can nominate candidates. In South Africa, an ad-hoc Parliamentary Committee is set up to interview potential Commissioners following a nationwide public announcement of the vacancies. Interviews take place in public and civil society organizations are allowed to attend. 50. In the development of the law establishing the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, which was yet to be adopted at the time this report was finalized, it was emphasized that its independence would be strengthened if it was empowered to recruit its own staff and that there should be no civil service secondment at senior level to the body.19 51. On the other hand, it has also been reported that the selection process for members of the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines is not defined in its regulatory framework. This lack of procedure reportedly allows for the President to be the only authority entitled to nominate and appoint its members. The Commission is advocating for the adoption of the “Commission on Human Rights Charter” precisely to strengthen its organizational, operational and fiscal structure, including the procedure for selection and appointment of its members. 19 10 Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality, “Report on hearings in relation to the Scheme of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Bill” (July 2012).