A/HRC/22/47 59. The Special Rapporteur and her predecessor have raised the issue of lack of financial and human resources in several reports following fact-finding visits (Armenia, Honduras, Ireland, Togo and the Democratic Republic of Congo).22 60. It is reported that some national institutions have discretion to propose their own budgets to legislators (Uruguay). In the case of the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, the draft budget is made public when submitted to Parliament for approval. 61. However, responses to the questionnaire sent by the Special Rapporteur indicate that there are instances where the financial autonomy of national institutions has been challenged and/or revoked (Panama and the Philippines) by the Supreme Court. This has had an important impact on the independence and capacity of the institutions. 62. It has been widely reported that national institutions face financial constraints of various sorts. In some countries, there are limitations to the type of expense to be covered under public budgets, such as in Jordan, where the budget allocated is only meant to cover operational costs and not activities. This severely undermines the capacity of national institutions to interact with defenders, amongst other things. 63. In other countries, national institutions claim to be financially ill-resourced in general which, in some instances, amounts to lack of basic office equipment (Burkina Faso) or means that they are not able to be fully operational in the regions, thereby restricting opportunities for interaction with grass-roots organizations (South Africa). An extreme situation would be the case of the national institution in El Salvador which, 20 years after its establishment, does not have premises of its own. 64. The Special Rapporteur is conscious of the fact that the financial crisis in 2008 and the economic recession that followed have led to drastic cuts in public expenditure affecting the public sector in general, including national institutions. Nevertheless, she strongly recommends that national institutions be adequately resourced and be able to propose and manage their own budgets independently. 4. Composition and pluralism 65. The Paris Principles establish that the composition of a national institution and the appointment of its members should ensure a pluralistic representation of the actors involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. NGOs working on human rights issues are acknowledged specifically in this context. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation emphasizes the importance for national institutions of keeping regular contact with civil society and acknowledges that pluralism can be achieved in various ways. 66. National institutions should therefore be inclusive and accessible to the different constituencies. This could be reflected at the level of the composition of their membership and staff, but also in the ways they interact with the main stakeholders, including defenders and activists. Interaction with civil society will reinforce the credibility and legitimacy of the institution and can certainly strengthen the design and implementation of its activities. 67. As mentioned, members of the national institution in Uruguay are usually nominated by NGOs, and all five current members come from the NGO sector. In New Zealand, civil society is part of the interview panels for the selection of members of the national institution. 22 12 In alphabetical order: Armenia (A/HRC/16/44/Add.2); Honduras (A/HRC/22/47/Add.1); Ireland (A/HRC/22/47/Add.3); Togo (A/HRC/10/12/Add.2); Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/HRC/13/22/Add.2).