A/HRC/24/47 (c) B. Social: withdrawal, irritability, avoidance (of reminders of the event). 56 Impact on local communities 27. Communities living in areas chronically affected by the scourge of terrorist hostagetaking bear a constant burden of insecurity. Generally, terrorist hostage-taking groups, such as FARC in Colombia, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahara-Sahel region operate in areas that are characterized by poor law enforcement and absence of effective governmental control.57 In many cases, terrorist operatives take advantage of communities living in peripheral areas characterized by problems of rampant insecurity, and sociopolitical, economic and cultural marginality. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism listed, inter alia, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion and socioeconomic marginalization as conducive to the spread of terrorism. 58 In many places where such conditions prevail, terrorists, including hostage-takers, try to fill a void in governance by establishing strong links with local communities. In a number of cases, terrorist organizations have succeeded in supplanting the State and imposed themselves as the provider of services and protectors of communities. In the absence of an appropriate response from legitimate State authorities, the local populace may see individuals or groups that commit kidnappings as heroic figures who defy the authorities and helping the poor and weak.59 Examples from Afghanistan, Colombia, the Philippines and, more recently, the Sahara-Sahel region, including northern Mali, show, however, that control of entire regions and communities by terrorists increases the burden of insecurity and marginality rather than help to solve the development and other challenges faced by local communities. 28. In North Africa, for instance, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is reported to have developed cooperative relationships with regional drug traffickers, criminal organizations and rebel groups to increase their resources and financing.60 In order to succeed, it has relied on established links with local communities by casting itself as an ally and potential protector of local communities.61 Integration within local communities has allowed the group to deepen its roots, develop its resource base and develop its operational strength. 62 The escalation of the crisis in northern Mali since represents one extreme illustration of the lasting impact that terrorism in general and terrorist hostage-taking activities for ransom in particular can have on the stability of a country or, indeed, of an entire region. While a multiplicity of factors and actors account for the dynamics that led to the occupation of northern Mali by a composite alliance (including the Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), terrorist hostage-taking activities conducted by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region played a significant role in financing the forces at the heart of the insurgency.63 Established links with local communities of the Sahel region 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 Ibid., p. 18. See also A. Schmid, “Magnitude of Terrorist Victimization” in Dilip K. Das and Peter C. Kratcoski (eds.), Meeting the Challenges of Global Terrorism: Prevention, Control and Recovery (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 38–39. Wright, Kidnap for Ransom (see footnote 47), p. 192. A/HRC/16/51, para. 12. Wright, Kidnap for Ransom (see footnote 47), p. 192. Modibo Goïta, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy”, Africa Security Brief, No. 11, February 2011, p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid. See Wolfram Lacher, “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region”, Carnegie 11