A/HRC/24/47 enabled Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb not only to “confront and resist government security services but also undermine Sahelian States from within”.64 29. In the Philippines, the different rebel and terrorist groups have used historic grievances of the Muslim communities in Mindanao to garner support from the Moro population.65 According to some accounts, membership in Abu Sayyaf skyrocketed from a few hundred to more than a thousand after its first major kidnapping payoff as the prospect of money-making enticed new recruits. 66 In October 2012, news sources reported that the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had agreed on a cessation of hostilities.67 30. In Europe, such terrorist groups as Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) engaged in kidnapping operations for ransom, and used the ransom money to bankroll their terrorist activities and networks. Their activities – including kidnappings of businessmen in the case of ETA (mostly in Spain and France in the 1970s and 1980s), and of persons suspected of collaborating with authorities in the case of the IRA – imposed a tremendous security and financial burden on populations living in areas where they frequently operated.68 31. The prevailing lawlessness and constant fear of reprisals in regions plagued by the phenomenon of terrorist hostage-taking jeopardize the security and well-being of local communities. Examples from North Africa, Chechnya, Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq and Afghanistan show that the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms — mostly economic, social, civil and political rights, including the right to development — by members of local communities is extremely restricted. Repression, corruption and uncertainty associated with the parallel economy underlying terrorist hostage-taking and related illicit trafficking activities have a clearly detrimental impact on the productive sectors of local economies, including tourism, farming, trade and, more generally, the socioeconomic development of the affected regions. 32. In some contexts, such as the Sahel region, the socioeconomic consequences of terrorist hostage-taking activities are particularly devastating, and resulted in a substantial decline in socioeconomic opportunities. Jobs and income generated by a once-flourishing tourism industry have virtually disappeared.69 The decline in opportunities is among other enabling factors that push some members of local populations to join terrorist organizations. The generalized insecurity associated with terrorism and hostage-taking 64 65 66 67 68 69 12 Endowment Papers, September 2012 (available from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf); Annual Review of World Affairs, Africa, Strategic Survey 1, 2012, pp. 272–274; and Larémont, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (see footnote 32), pp. 242–268. Goïta, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat” (see footnote 60), p. 2. Astrid Tuminez, “Rebellion, Terrorism, Peace: America's Unfinished Business with Muslims in the Philippines”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 211–223. Justine A. Rosenthal, “For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 31, No. 6, 2008, p. 487. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Philippine Government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front reach historic peace agreement”, 8 October 2012. Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippine-government-and-moro-islamic-liberation-frontreach-historic-peace. See Mikel Buesa and Thomas Baumert, “Untangling ETA’s Finance: An in-depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network and the Money it Handles”, Defence and Peace Economics, available from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2012.710812; Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups” (see footnote 28), pp. 772–775; and Wright, Kidnap for Ransom (see footnote 47), p. 190. Goïta, “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat” (see footnote 60), pp. 3–4.