A/HRC/12/48 page 125 • In the context of the beginning of ground operations on 3 January, 300,000 leaflets were dropped in the entire Gaza Strip, especially in the northern and eastern parts; • On 5 January, 300,000 leaflets were dropped in Gaza City, Khan Yunis and Rafah; • In total some 165,000 telephone calls were made throughout the military operations;347 • In total some 2,500,000 leaflets were dropped.348 501. In addition to these measures, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that the telephone calls were both direct calls and pre-recorded messages, that it made radio broadcasts, and that it developed a practice of dropping apparently light explosives on rooftops (referred to by some as “roof-knocking”).349 502. The Mission has reviewed the text of several of the leaflets dropped by the Israeli armed forces and listened to all of the messages recorded on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.350 It accepts that Israel dropped leaflets, made phone calls, left recorded messages and dropped smaller explosives on roofs as stated by the Israeli Government. 1. Telephone calls 503. The Mission received first-hand information about some of these methods in its interviews with witnesses in Gaza. In the report on the attack at al-Fakhura Street junction (see chap. X), the Mission notes the credible account of Mr. Abu Askar of the telephone warning he received as a result of which he was able to evacuate up to 40 people from his and other houses. He received that call at around 1.45 a.m. and Israeli forces destroyed his house with a missile strike seven minutes later. 504. The Mission is also aware of circumstances in which telephone warnings may have caused fear and confusion. Al-Bader Flour Mills Co. (see chap. XIII) received two recorded messages indicating the mill was to be destroyed, but neither of these was acted upon. Five days later the mill was struck in the early hours of the morning with no warning whatsoever. The owners of the business and their staff suffered anxiety by having to evacuate the premises on two occasions as a result of receiving such messages when no strikes took place. 347 “The operation in Gaza…”, para. 264. 348 Ibid. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/IDF_warns_Gaza_population_7-Jan-2009.htm .With regard to roof-knocking, see, for instance, Cordesman, op. cit., p. 13 (the Israeli armed forces “developed small 10-20 kilogram bombs that could be used as both warning shots – sometimes referred to as knocking on the roof”…). 349 350 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/IDF_warns_Gaza_population_7-Jan-2009.htm.