A/HRC/24/42 in transition processes. The more the bulk of a commission’s work ventures into functions that strain both its capacities and its sources of authority and legitimacy, the more difficulties it will encounter demonstrating its effectiveness. 2. Selection of commissioners 53. Truth commissions derive their power to a large extent from the moral authority and competence of commissioners. Hence selecting suitable commissioners is a crucial factor in their good functioning. As selection modes vary greatly, this report will distinguish in a simple manner methods of direct selection from consultative procedures which formally involve a variety of stakeholders in the selection process. 54. Direct selection, usually by the same authority that establishes the commission’s mandate and without a process of formal consultations, has been used in a large number of cases, such as in Argentina,62 Chile,63 Peru64 and Brazil.65 Direct selection is however not a Latin-American phenomenon, as demonstrated by the Moroccan case, where the commissioners of IER were appointed directly, through a Royal Dahir, by King Mohammed VI.66 55. It is not only executive powers that have used direct selection. The draft transitional justice law currently being considered in Tunisia empowers the National Constituent Assembly, and, in first instance, a committee composed of the President or Vice-President of the Assembly and the presidents of the parliamentary blocs to appoint the 15 commissioners, ensuring that each sex represents at least one third of the membership.67 56. On the opposite side of the spectrum lie selection processes that are by design consultative in nature. This approach has been adopted for the selection of commissioners in South Africa,68 Sierra Leone,69 Liberia,70 Timor-Leste71 and Kenya.72 The model involves 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 16 Decree 187/83 (fn 32). Confirming the point that most cases do not fall squarely on either side of the classificatory spectrum, the decree creates a 16-member commission, with ten members appointed by the President and three additional members to be appointed by each of the two chambers of Congress “as direct representatives of the people and of the Provinces of the Nation”. One of the chambers did not make any appointments. The design thus involved also the legislative power in the selection of commissioners (12 men and one woman finally appointed). In the Supreme Decree that established the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of Chile, President Aylwin announced the names of the eight commissioners (six men, two women), designated its president, and even its executive secretary, see Supreme Decree No. 355, 25 April 1990. Higher Resolutions/Resoluciónes Supremas N° 330-2001-PCM, 6 June 2001; N° 065-2001-PCM, 4 June 2001; N° 101-2001-PCM, 4 September 2001; N° 438-2001-PCM, 5 September 2001 (ten men, two women appointed). Law No. 12.528, 18 November 2011; Diario Official da Uniao LIII, No. 91, 11 May 2012 (five men, two women appointed). Dahir No. 1.04.42 of the 19th of Safar 1425, 10 April 2004 (16 men, one woman). Legislative bodies may be considered more deliberative and consultative than executive powers. This may or may not be the case. In Chile, for example, transitional justice measures had long been debated by the different parties of the coalition that won the elections which brought President Aylwin to power, and were part of the political platform of the coalition, so in this sense, the measures had been the subject of public deliberation. See Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile, in: de Greiff, The Handbook of Reparations (fn 49). On Tunisia, see the Special Rapporteur’s report on his visit to the country, A/HRC/24/42/Add.1. 17 members (nine men, eight women), see TRC of South Africa, Final Report (fn 51), vol. 1. Seven members (four men, three women), see TRC of Sierra Leone, Final Report (fn 40), vol. 1, ch. 2. Nine members (five men, four women), see TRC of Liberia, Final Report (fn 40), vol. 1.