A/HRC/24/42 61. The design of selection procedures has received more attention than the selection criteria. To the extent that foundational documents of truth commissions mention criteria that commissioners have to satisfy – many do not – they include generalities relating to moral standing and reputation, rather than actual achievements in related areas or technical expertise. The Special Rapporteur urges those responsible for designing truth commission mandates, including selection mechanisms, to articulate more clearly the relevant criteria, beyond generalities concerning reputation. No position of comparable responsibility would be filled on the basis of such poorly defined standards. 75 62. Of late, several truth commissions have included non-national members. The motivation for this seems to be twofold: to enlarge the pool of candidates, and to appoint individuals who are unrelated to local disputes. Generally, this has been a fruitful effort. However, the Special Rapporteur highlights that international appointments cannot make up for deficiencies in the selection procedures of truth commissioners. 3. Staffing, budgeting and management 63. Considering the actual lifespan of commissions and the immensity of their task, time is a scarce resource. Lengthening their operational mandate is not a viable solution in most cases.76 In this context, the preparatory period is crucial. Some commissions have been given a preparatory period of two to three months,77 which has proven to be insufficient, as many truth commissions are still dealing with operational matters well beyond this period. Extending the preparatory phase to about a six-month range would increase the likelihood that commissions would be able to discharge their substantive responsibilities during their allotted temporal mandate. This report emphasizes three sets of issues whose resolution during a preparatory period would have a positive impact on the subsequent performance of a commission. (a) Staffing 64. Staffing needs of a truth commission are related to many contextual factors, including the universe of cases to be addressed, the pre-existing work on those cases (largely by NGOs), the collaboration it receives from authorities and other former agents of violence and, importantly, the mandated goals of the commission. However, two general points can still be made. First, truth commissions have become large operations: CONADEP (1983) had 60 staff members, the staffing of many others was in the range of 200-300, while CAVR (2002) had over 500 staff.78 Clearly, institutions with such large staff numbers require careful advance planning, budgeting and management, especially if they are to operate efficiently during a relatively short lifespan. Second, given current trends, commissions call for staff with multidisciplinary competences.79 As not all labour 75 76 77 78 79 18 The criteria should be both positive (e.g., demonstrable commitment to and leadership in the cause of human rights; demonstrated accomplishments in the area) as well as negative (e.g., demonstrable lack of conflict of interest – no prior membership in or support for an organization whose behaviour might be the subject of investigation by the commission). In addition to losing part of the signalling power, a very extended mandate makes commissions miss a window of opportunity that allows them to capitalize on the positive reformist impetus of transitional periods, increases the resource burden, and generates challenges associated with the rotation of personnel, including commissioners. See Hayner (fn 21), pp. 33, 43, 58. Dates in parenthesis correspond to the year each commission started operations; numbers of staff at peak-years, see Hayner (fn 21), pp. 268-273. Aside from lawyers and other professionals familiar with criminal law; human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights; and humanitarian law, truth commissions require competencies