A/HRC/24/42 of internal differentiation and harmonious integration are anticipated and resolved as much as possible. 70. Finally, truth commissions have often found it challenging to articulate the relationship between the commissioners. This issue inevitably involves a personal dimension, hence it is even less likely than the previously mentioned topics to be resolved through a formulaic approach. However, some structural factors can exacerbate potential frictions. A non-exhaustive list includes the following: • Appointment procedures that sacrifice competence for the sake of representativeness. These risk introducing into the nucleus of the commission prevailing political or social cleavages. • Loose internal regulations, or a protracted period before internal regulations are defined, which allow each commissioner to carve out his or her own functions independently of a coherent, shared plan. • Ambiguous rules concerning the public role of commissioners and the authority to speak on its behalf. • Unclear rules concerning relations between commissioners and different stakeholders both within and outside government. • Commissioners that act ad honorem and only part time, and who therefore need to keep their regular occupations, and hence allegiances to particular constituencies. C. Ex post challenges 1. Implementation 71. Truth commissions have become the subject of increased criticism for the lack of follow-up on their recommendations. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that truth commissions are only in exceptional cases and in relation to only few initiatives, implementing agencies. As temporary bodies, most commissions will have ceased to exist at the time of implementation of their recommendations, a responsibility that lies primarily with governments. (a) Articulating recommendations 72. The call for comprehensiveness regarding analysis and proposals for thorough institutional restructuring has led to a significant expansion in the length of commission reports, which poses a problem for them being used as policymaking tools.83 The main difficulty, however, is that in a short timespan no commission can make its recommendations on institutional design involving political, economic and legal dimensions truly “policy friendly”. In some cases, complex legislative action is not all that is required; constitutional reforms may also be necessary.84 83 84 20 Again, even if not linear, the expansion in length of truth commission reports has led to documents that virtually no policymaker will read in their entirety: the shortest report is that of the Commission on Truth for El Salvador, at 252 pages; CONADEP’s report was less than 500 pages long; Chile’s TRC more than 1,100 pages; South Africa’s TRC more than 4500; Peru’s TRC almost 8,000; Sierra Leone’s TRC almost 1,900; East Timor’s CAVR more than 3200; Liberia’s TRC almost 1,400. Indeed, Sierra Leone’s TRC suggests the country should consider “the creation of a new constitution”, TRC of Sierra Leone, Witness to Truth (fn 40), vol. 2, ch. 3, para. 38.