A/HRC/16/24 the investigation were apparently sent to the MAG in August 2009.30 Reports indicate that, after almost two years, the results of the investigation are still under review by the MAG. 3. Other investigations 38. As the Committee indicated in its previous report (A/HRC/15/50, para. 42), the Government of Israel established a public commission – known as the Turkel Commission – to examine the maritime incident of 31 May 2010. The Commission – which includes two international observers – was mandated, inter alia, to examine the question whether the “mechanism for examining and investigating complaints and claims raised in relation to violations of the laws of armed conflict, as conducted in Israel generally, … conform with the obligations of the State of Israel under the rules of international law”.31 39. The Committee considers that the work of the Turkel Commission is directly relevant to its own mandate, because it is evidence that Israel does have a mechanism for carrying out inquiries into decisions and policies adopted by high-level officials. (The Committee focused exclusively on the process and methodology agreed upon by the Turkel Commission; it did not address – and does not endorse – the substance of the Commission’s analysis and conclusions with respect to the flotilla incident.) It notes that Commission members interviewed and actively questioned a number of high-level officials, including the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Chief Military Advocate, and members of Parliament, as well as representatives of human rights organizations. An analysis of the transcripts of the public hearings demonstrates that the Commission members – with active participation from the international observers – thoroughly examined the controversial legal and political issues presented for their consideration. The Turkel Commission issued part one of its report on 21 January 2011. Part two of the report, which will address the effectiveness of Israel’s mechanism for investigations, will be issued later in 2011. B. Assessment 1. Independence and impartiality 40. The Committee noted in its previous report that Israel’s military justice system provides for mechanisms to ensure its independence, in particular the fact that the MAG is not hierarchically subordinate to the Chief of General Staff and that his decisions are subject to review by the Attorney-General and by the Supreme Court (A/HRC/15/50, para. 52). The Committee has not received any new evidence that challenges this finding. 41. The Committee further noted that notwithstanding the built-in structural guarantees to ensure the independence of the MAG, his dual responsibilities as legal advisor to the Chief of Staff and other military authorities, and his role as supervisor of criminal investigations within the military, raise concerns in the present context given allegations in the FFM report that those who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operation in Gaza were complicit in international humanitarian and human rights law violations (A/HRC/12/48, para. 1895). It is notable that the MAG himself, in his testimony to the Turkel Commission, pointed out that the military investigations system he heads is not a viable mechanism to investigate and assess high-level policy decisions. When questioned by Commission members about his “dual hat” and whether his position at the apex of legal 30 31 10 B’Tselem, Void of Responsibility: Israeli Military Policy Not to Investigate Killings of Palestinians by Soldiers (October 2010), pp. 20-21. Government Resolution of 14.6.2010, quoted in the Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (The Turkel Commission), part one, January 2011, p. 17.