A/HRC/33/48 set out in article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)27 as a defence by States imposing sanctions, it is to be noted that the legislative history of article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade indicates that this provision was not meant to be excluded from the WTO dispute settlement procedures.28 That reinforces the argument that security exceptions were not conceived of as a self-judging provision.29 On a related note, it has also been suggested that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body could possibly be seized of a dispute carrying human rights arguments. 30 V. Remedies available to individuals and entities affected by unilateral coercive measures A. Domestic remedies 31. Whether individuals or entities subject to unilateral coercive measures can benefit from effective judicial review before the domestic courts of the targeting State(s) depends in the first place on the country considered. It appears that in most jurisdictions, domestic courts are unlikely to grant remedies to individuals or entities affected by unilateral coercive measures, as the courts display a significant measure of deference vis-à-vis the political decisions underlying sanctions. It should also be noted that, under European Union law, domestic, or national, courts throughout the European Union are bound to apply European Union restrictive measures. 32. There have been cases, however, in which national implementation measures of United Nations sanctions have been challenged before domestic courts, for example, in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.31 It is unclear whether any of the applicants were awarded damages. Reportedly, a case concerning sanctions-related damages is currently pending before the British High Court of Justice. The case was brought by Bank Mellat (an Iranian bank), after the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ruled in 2013 that the 2009 order of the Government of the United Kingdom imposing financial restrictions on the bank in the United Kingdom was unlawful. 27 28 29 30 31 This article allows a party to disregard its obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade by “taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” with reference to various situations, including “in time of war or other emergency in international relations” and “in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security”. This latter provision clearly refers to obligations to comply with Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and, as such, does not cover unilateral coercive measures. See M. J. Hahn, “Vital interests and the law of GATT: an analysis of GATT’s security exception”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 12 (1991), pp. 556-567. See Mitsuo Matsushita and others, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 597. See for example, G. Marceau, “WTO dispute settlement and human rights”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 13 (2002), pp. 753-814. See for example The Queen on The Application of Aguy Georgias v. Secretary of State for The Home Department [2008] EWHC 1599, in which a member of the Government of Zimbabwe targeted by a travel ban imposed on him by Council Common Position 2007/235/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe, brought a claim for judicial review, which was dismissed by the High Court. 9