A/HRC/28/48 mechanism on torture in line with the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment — which Afghanistan has not yet ratified — which could be located within the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, with authority and enhanced capacity to inspect all detention facilities. UNAMA/OHCHR also encourages the Government to invite the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to visit Afghanistan so that he can provide advice on efforts to address the issue of torture and ill-treatment. 32. Throughout 2014, the monitoring activities of UNAMA/OHCHR mainly focused on the Government’s implementation of Presidential Decree No. 129, which former President Karzai had issued on 16 February 2013 in response to a Government fact-finding delegation’s report that had validated UNAMA findings in its January 2013 report. This decree ordered the National Directorate of Security, the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court to investigate allegations of torture, prosecute alleged perpetrators, release detainees and prisoners in arbitrary detention, increase access of defence lawyers and medical personnel to detainees to prevent torture and arbitrary detention, and ensure accountability, and report back to the President’s Office every three months. UNAMA/OHCHR findings indicate that, despite the 2013 developments, torture and ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees persist in some detention facilities, with few allegations of torture investigated, prosecuted or subjected to disciplinary action. Measures taken by the Government, such as internal investigations and the establishment of a cadre of National Directorate of Security human rights officers are not robust enough to prevent and end torture. Presidential Decree No. 129 alone is not an effective deterrent to torture; greater accountability is needed to end impunity and bring perpetrators to justice. 33. The only prosecution, trial (in mid-April 2014) and subsequent imprisonment of perpetrators of torture known to UNAMA/OHCHR has been of two National Directorate of Security officers in the province of Uruzgan. In a few other cases, Directorate personnel who committed torture or ill-treatment were reassigned to other functions or simply had to pledge not to re-offend. No national police officials were found to have been investigated or prosecuted on allegations of torture or ill-treatment. 34. Defence lawyers have access to provincial National Directorate of Security detention facilities, but can usually access detainees only after the investigation phase has been concluded. The Legal Aid Department of the Ministry of Justice lacks capacity and cannot address the current shortfall of legal aid defence lawyers alone. Most medical personnel working in detention facilities lack independence as they report directly to the Directorate and the Ministry of Interior, and fear that they will face reprisals if they endorse findings of physical abuse or torture. 35. The Supreme Court has issued instructions to judges reminding them to reject confessions obtained through torture and to dismiss cases that rely solely on evidence thus obtained. However, these obligations are not respected in practice, and prosecutors or judges routinely disregard or dismiss allegations of forced confessions. These confessions constitute the primary basis for proving a case and justifying a conviction in court. 36. In response to the findings of the UNAMA/OHCHR report of 20 January 2013,1 ISAF suspended transfers of detainees it had captured to 35 Afghan detention facilities and redesigned its detainee certification review process to include inspections, extended training and capacity-building of all national police and National Directorate of Security 1 10 Available from www.unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5b37o%3D&tabid= 12254&language=en-US.