A/HRC/36/40 indirectly operate with tax havens and thereby deprive countries of their legitimate tax revenues, crucial to implement human rights obligations. 93. The World Bank Board of Governors should issue a clear directive that the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes must refrain from interfering with the ontological functions of the State, which are to regulate in the public interest, including through environmental, health, social and labour legislation. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes should not lend its services to litigation that puts those functions of the State into question. Rather the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes should discover its vocation to serve in an advisory capacity.117 To the extent that there is risk involved, the investor should take advantage of the Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and obtain risk insurance there (see A/HRC/30/44, A/HRC/33/40 and A/70/285). 94. Countries that benefit from World Bank financing should ensure that all loans they request and all foreign direct investment they receive are used in a manner that advances the enjoyment of human rights and does not result in the enrichment of a few at the expense of the many. In particular, monitoring mechanisms must be in place to ensure transparency and accountability, regular monitoring of business activity and easy recourse and remedy to persons adversely affected by World Bankfunded projects and IMF-funded government loans and “bail outs”. 95. Donor countries should: (a) Demand that their money be used only in ways that promote the common good; (b) Deny funds unless and until there is an effective procedure for providing redress and reparation to victims of possible violations; (c) Terminate financing of ongoing projects whenever it is clear that human rights violations are being committed, and rule out a return to direct budget support until there is significant improvement in the human rights situation; (d) Recognize their responsibility by insisting on independent investigations, without the participation of governments suspected of corruption or other violations. 96. The media should objectively inform about abuses associated with loan agreements when they occur, particularly instances of evictions, destruction of the environment, child labour and corruption. 97. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists should focus on early warning so as to help prevent abuses accompanying World Bank-financed projects and should ferret out cases of corruption, money-laundering and collusion with tax havens. 98. Civil society organizations should alert the public to the dangers of megaprojects and assist affected communities in presenting complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel118 and to the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman. 119 117 118 119 See Kinda Mohamadieh, Lean Ka-Min and Anna Bernando, Investment Treaties: Views and Experiences from Developing Countries (Geneva, South Centre, 2015). See also www.iisd.org/itn/2008/08/06/south-american-alternative-to-icsid-in-the-works-as-governmentscreate-an-energy-treaty/, http://old.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-561061, http://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2012/01/19/venezuela-follows-bolivia-and-ecuador-withplans-to-denounce-icsid-convention/, and Rafael Ramírez, Nuestra Industria Petrolera es un Baluarte de Soberanía (Caracas, Petroleros de Venezuela, 2014). See http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/FileaRequest.aspx. See www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/filecomplaint/ and https://www.cao-grm.org/. 23