A/HRC/36/40 Annex VII Summary of CAO Cases 1. The CAO investigation of IFC Investment in Eco Oro Minerals Corp. Ltd., a Canadian mining company conducting open-pit mining in Colombia. Concerning the lack of consultation and disclosure the CAO concluded: “IFC identified significant gaps in the company’s stakeholder engagement strategy as the project proceeded. This became evident in late 2009, following the submission of the open-pit mine EIA to the government that was rejected due to non-conformance with national requirements. IFC recognized that the project faced considerable opposition from the citizens of Bucaramanga. At this point IFC recommended that the company improve its stakeholder engagement strategy so as to strengthen community support. CAO notes that the limited scope applied to the project at appraisal and categorization of the investment for IFC’s purposes did not reflect affected community members’ understanding of risks.” 2. With regard to community health, safety and security, CAO determined that: “there was not sufficient information to establish whether IFC assured itself of the company’s compliance with PS4 requirements.” 3. With regard to conservation and sustainable natural recourse management, CAO concluded: “IFC supervision documentation does not show substantive progress on the completion of necessary studies. IFC has not pursued a remedy, but has made subsequent investments in the company.” 4. The CAO investigation in Corporación Dinant S.A. de C.V., Honduras, published in December 2013 made findings that should have motivated IFC to fundamentally review its practices: “IFC was or should have been aware of a series of public allegations and negative perceptions in relation to its client that went significantly beyond those that were considered in the course of its integrity due diligence process… The detailed six-part integrity due diligence process should have been adhered to. IFC’s failure to do this was out of compliance with the relevant procedure. …IFC’s failure to disclose the Dinant E&S Assessment was not compliant with its Policy on Disclosure of Information (para 13). IFC remains non-compliant on this point. IFC supported a breach of Performance Standard 1 (paras 20 & 26) by (a) accepting the client’s disclosure of a modified translation of the ESRS in the place of the E&S Assessment, and (b) failing to assure itself that the client’s ESAP was disclosed to affected communities in an accessible form. IFC failed to ensure that the Dinant E&S Assessment met the consultation requirements set out in PS1 (para.21) … IFC failed to adequately assess its client’s performance against the full range of ESAP CODs that had fallen due prior to making its November 2009 disbursement to Dinant … IFC failed to “develop and retain the information needed to assess the status of [its client’s] compliance with the Performance Standards during supervision … 5. In the light of the above, IFC decided to continue financing Dinant indirectly, through loans to Honduran Banks. The CAO Investigation of IFC Environmental and Social performance in relation to Investments in Banco Financiera Comercial Hondureña concerned the circumvention of WB rules concerning upper limits for loans to projects by providing the loans to banks that would in turn loan to the project — no strings attached. The IFC had already lent $15 million to an agribusiness company in Honduras, which was under investigation in connection to allegations of violence against farmers on and around Dinant palm oil plantations. The CAO found that: 45