A/HRC/4/71 page 16 ethically because their action can be complained about and investigated. Government agencies often establish their own internal procedures for handling public complaints that ombudsman offices address, thereby adding another layer of scrutiny and transparency within the Government. The possibility of an adverse finding by an ombudsman, which would damage a person’s career and financial prospects, acts as a deterrent. Moreover, ombudsman offices often view themselves as champions of improving and strengthening Government and as such act as barriers to corrupt practices. 37. Mr. Romaszewski, member of the Polish Senate, maintained that the fight against “pathologies” like corruption always involves limiting, in one way or another, the human rights and freedoms of citizens. The challenge, according to Mr. Romaszewski, is “proportionality” between the anti-corruption measures and the hazards created by the corruption. He emphasized the importance of good laws and the need for ordinary citizens to understand and to know how to use them. He noted that often laws limit rights and liberties in some way. For example, Poland adopted an act that permits and regulates lobbying. Mr. Romaszewski noted, however, that lobbying per se is a violation of civil rights in a sense, because it permits those with financial means to hire professional lobbyists to seek more influence on parliament’s decisions on the law. Another mechanism that has been instituted and which entails limits to rights is the obligatory declaration of incomes by public officials, which can be seen as violating the “presumption of innocence”. A policy that Mr. Romaszewski believes Poland “got right” is the electoral campaign financing law, which, by placing caps on monetary contributions and requiring that they be proportionate to income, is aimed at preventing the purchase of influence over government policies. Noting that corruption takes a variety of forms, Mr. Romaszewski distinguished between high-level and low-level corruption, active and passive corruption, and the giver and taker of bribes and recommended that sanctions and measures correspond to the nature of the act. He further argued that, because it is rooted in greed, corruption should be subject to material sanctions and penalties should involve forfeiture of assets. As for the means used to detect corruption, Mr. Romaszewski observed that the privatization of enforcement techniques (e.g.: wire-taps, surveillance), which has made them available for use by others (e.g.: the media, employers), makes it difficult to limit Governments’ use of these techniques. 38. Phil Matsheza, from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which is mandated with implementing UNCAC and supporting Member States in their anti-corruption efforts, began by posing two questions: (a) whether the relationship between fighting corruption and protecting human rights is necessarily complementary, and (b) whether any inherent contradictions exist between them. Mr. Matsheza affirmed that corruption undermines human rights, particularly the principles of non-discrimination and the rule of law, and that it is rife where the rule of law is weak. He pointed to the many principles that human rights, good governance and anti-corruption work share: transparency, accountability, citizen participation, rule of law, freedom of expression, right to information, separation of powers, equality and non-discrimination, equity and fairness. Mr. Matsheza noted, however, the persistence of abuses despite consensus regarding the relationship between corruption and human rights, and the existence of shared principles. The question he then tackled was whether these abuses were a result of flaws inherent in the norms and standards, or whether they were produced during implementation by States. To answer this question he turned to State practices and the normative framework.