A/HRC/17/48 26. In Abidjan, the most active militias in the post-electoral crisis were armed elements of FESCI and militias attached to the Front national pour la libération totale de la Côte d'Ivoire (FNLTCI). 27. Notable pro-Gbagbo militias in the west were: • Le Front de libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO): With a membership 7,000 strong, it is directed by the leader and war chief Denis Glofiéi Mohu, who commands all the western militias. He is close to Mr. Blé Goudé and was seen at the beginning of the crisis with some men in the district of Yopougon in Abidjan; • L´Union des patriotes résistants du Grand Ouest (UPRGO): With some 500 members, it is directed by the leader and war chief Gabriel Banao, a retired general. At a meeting with the Commission, Mr. Banao acknowledged that UPRGO used 200 Guéré combatants in Côte d'Ivoire at the time of the ethnic clashes to gain control of Duékoué. Moreover, the Commission was able to consult documents seized when FRCI took the city, including a letter signed by Mr. Banao and addressed to Mr. Gbagbo in which he requested medical assistance. Mr. Banao told the Commission that, as early as 2003, Mr. Gbagbo had given money to the chief of FLGO, General Maho, to finance other ethnic militias of the Grand Ouest region; • L´Alliance des patriotes Wê (AP-Wê) with under 1,000 men, nearly half of whom are Liberians. It is headed by Julien Mompeho “Colombo” and is active in Duékoué, Bangolo, Guiglo, Bloléuin and Toulepleu; • Le Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l´Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI) is headed by Pastor Gammi. 28. All the western militias (AP-Wê, UPRGO, MILOCI, FLGO) are affiliated with the Front de Résistance du Grand Ouest (FRGO) headed by “General” Denis Maho Glofiéi. Some militias are associated with Liberian militias. Militias loyal to the Ouattara camp 29. The Dozo, who are traditional hunters, are FAFN sympathizers. They are suspected of arms trafficking along the north-west border and of armed attacks in the areas of Bangolo, Duékoué and Kouibly; they are also identified as the main perpetrators of the massacres carried out on 28 and 29 March in Duékoué, although pro-Gbagbo mercenaries are said to be responsible for some of the killings. 30. The “Invisible Commando” had a membership some 5,000 strong at the end of the fighting. Its heartland and field of operations was in the PK-18 district of Abidjan, in particular the local school where the militiamen received their training. It was officially under the command of Ibrahim Coulibaly, known as “IB”, killed on 27 April during a standoff with the FRCI because of his refusal to disarm his men. Mercenaries 31. The presence of mercenaries has been identified mainly in the pro-Gbagbo camp, but there are also a number of them in the pro-Ouattara camp. Some 4,500 of them are thought to have been involved in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. A large proportion are found in the west, near the border with Liberia, where they are recruited, often on an ethnic basis, as the same ethnic groups live on both sides of the border. The main elements that participated in the conflict are from the following groups: Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the LIMA (Libération du monde africain) special forces. LIMA, with some 2,000 men active mainly in Bloléquin, is said to have been led by commander Marc Gnatoa, killed on 6 May 2011. 10 GE.11-14375 (EXT)