A/HRC/17/48 supporters of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) and the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR). Between the two ballots, the Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP), which grouped together several political parties opposed to FPI and to La Majorité Présidentielle (LMP) of former President Gbagbo, called on the population, through the mouth of Mr. Bédié and his supporters, to vote for Mr. Ouattara in the second round. On 10 November, Mr. Ouattara publicly pledged to share power with the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) if Mr. Bédié won. 37. On 27 November, the day before the second round, President Gbagbo decreed a curfew. The opposition political parties unanimously denounced that measure. The Forces Nouvelles announced that they did not wish to apply the measure in the northern part of the country. It was maintained nevertheless, despite the representations made by the Ivorian peace process facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. In the circumstances, the Gbagbo camp described Mr.Ouattara as the “father of the rebellion” while inciting Gbagbo supporters to acts of violence against the Dioula ethnic group to which Mr. Ouattara belongs. The slogans “win or win” or “My votes goes 100 per cent to the original” adopted by President Gbagbo merely stoked up the tension. 38. On 28 November, the day of the second round of the election, attempts to prevent members of the Dioula and Baoulé ethnic communities from voting, particularly in Lakota, Issia and San Pedro, led to violent clashes between supporters of Mr. Gbagbo and those of Mr. Ouattara. In both camps, the obstacles put in the way by the opposing party in the area under its control were noted and condemned. B. Description of the facts 39. The crisis can be said to have developed, broadly speaking, in four stages, as reflected in the sequence of events. 40. The first stage, running from 27 November to mid-December 2010, was characterized by protest demonstrations in Abidjan and other cities following the curfew decreed on the eve of the second ballot and, later, after the results had been proclaimed. 41. The second stage began with the crackdown on RHDP marches on 16 December 2010 and continued until the end of January 2011. During that operation, the law enforcement services (police and gendarmerie) sought help from the military (FUMACO, BASA, BCS, BCP, DMIR, CECOS, Garde républicaine) and thereafter ceased to intervene except at the request and under the command of the chief of the army general staff. The clashes of 16 December marked a turning point in the conflict, not only because they clearly pointed to mounting tension but also because it was then that the use of organic weapons and the maintenance of law and order by security forces gave way to the deployment of weapons of war.7 Self-defence groups were then formed by local youths to protect the population, headed by FAFN commanders. They armed themselves by recovering weapons abandoned by FDS, as in San Pedro. 7 12 The following weapons were found to have been used: RPG-7 rocket launcher, heavy military weapons: mortar 82 (mine launcher), 120 mm. mortar, BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (or Stalin's organ), one of which was captured by FRCI in Toulepleu, T55 tanks, AML-90 (light armoured car), BTR-80 (armoured personnel carrier, seen in particular during the demonstration of 16 December 2010), BMP-2 (armoured personnel carrier), 12.7 machine-gun, 20 mm. cannon VLRA (light reconnaissance and support vehicle), ZSU-23-4 (anti-aircraft gun), ZSU 23-2, ERC-90 Sagaie (light armoured reconnaissance vehicle mounted with 90 mm. cannon), Mamba tank (vehicle with mediumrange ground-to-air missile defense system). GE.11-14375 (EXT)