A/HRC/44/26 of most international federations provide for the internal resolution of disputes, with appeals permitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Therefore, if national federations and their athletes, among others, wish to be recognized participants in their respective sport, they must generally agree to forego recourse to national courts in favour of private arbitration before that Court. Such mandatory arbitration shields the global sports system from regulation by national legal systems, which is where human rights are typically protected. 87 44. Instead, the primary default rules applied in appeals to the Court of Arbitration for Sport are the relevant sport regulations.88 Neither these regulations nor the statutes of sport governing bodies include human rights norms and standards as binding sources of law for adjudication. While the Olympic Charter and the statutes of many international federations contain a commitment to non-discrimination,89 most do not contain a broader commitment to respecting the full range of human rights of athletes. 90 45. As a result, consideration of human rights norms and standards in the resolution of sport disputes is limited. In Caster Semenya’s case, the panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport acknowledged that the regulations violated domestic and international human rights laws. It also noted the amicus curiae submission from United Nations Special Rapporteurs to that effect, as well as expert opinion evidence indicating the likelihood that the regulations would be found to breach the national laws of several specific jurisdictions. The panel accepted that there were important rights to equality and freedom from discrimination, including in sport, and that those rights found reflection in an array of domestic and international human rights instruments. The expert opinions could not, however, help to resolve what it viewed as a case of “conflicting rights” (between female athletes with and without certain variations in sex characteristics), which required “careful analysis of questions of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality”. The panel noted the regulations could be unenforceable in or contrary to the domestic law of different national jurisdictions, but considered it would be ultimately for the courts in those jurisdictions to make such determinations. 46. Nonetheless, IAAF asserts that the Court of Arbitration for Sport “is competent to rule on all legal claims, including human rights claims”, and that therefore its decision in the Semenya case “should be respected and enforced by the national courts”.91 For this reason, IAAF maintains that it “would defend any claim that was made in any national or international forum … (including if necessary on jurisdictional grounds)”. 92 This type of position, combined with the limited and inconsistent application of international human rights norms and standards to disputes before the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the fact that most Court arbitrators lack human rights expertise, 93 poses a serious challenge to access to effective remedies for athletes whose human rights are alleged to have been violated. 47. Decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport may be appealed only to the Swiss Federal Tribunal. The only substantive ground for setting aside an arbitral award before the Tribunal is a breach of Swiss public policy, meaning the award “disregards the essential and broadly acknowledged values which, according to prevailing views in Switzerland, should constitute the basis of any legal order”.94 The prohibition of discriminatory measures is one substantive policy recognized by the Tribunal. 95 Other national courts may also refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral award if doing so would be contrary to the public policy of that State,96 which may include certain fundamental human rights. Such a decision, however, 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 12 Findlay, “Accountability in the global regulation of sport”, p. 69. Court of Arbitration for Sport, Code of Sports-related Arbitration, rule 48; see also rule 45. See, for example, fundamental principles 4 and 6 of the Olympic Charter. IAAF has explicitly denied that it is bound by international human rights instruments because it is “not a public authority exercising state powers, but rather a private body exercising private (contractual) powers” (www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/iaaf-letter-iwg-wsi-iapesgw). See www.worldathletics.org/news/press-release/questions-answers-iaaf-female-eligibility-reg. Ibid. John G. Ruggie, “‘For the game. For the world.’ FIFA and human rights” (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard Kennedy School, 2016). Switzerland, A. v. Z., FIFA and X., Case No. 4A_304/2013, judgment of 3 March 2014, sect. 5.1. Ibid. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, article V (2) (b).