A/HRC/40/CRP.1 The Government offensive in Unity State in April to June 2018, appears to have been undertaken to a large degree for the purpose of gaining control of the road going south from Bentiu to Koch and Leer Counties, leading to Adok Port on the White Nile river,1010 and either pacifying or removing civilian population from the areas near the oil fields by using extremely violent methods.1011 This road passes the Thar Jath oil fields, in what is now Northern Liech State. As detailed elsewhere in this report (Section VII(A)), the renewed conflict in Unity in the first half of 2018 led to widespread and serious human rights violations by Government forces and affiliated militias. The desperate human rights situation in oil-rich areas is closely and directly linked to the past and more recent armed conflict. South Sudan’s oil industry currently remains overwhelmingly militarized and even securitized, with the National Security Services increasingly expanding their involvement in oil production and management: the NSS is mandated by law to provide security at oil fields, in cooperation with the South Sudanese national police.1012 The Commission has received information indicating that NSS officers are seconded to the joint ventures, and appear to co-locate with oil company’s staff both in their central headquarters as well as in the oil regions. 1013 The most high-ranking NSS official has reportedly held a seat on the board of South Sudan’s national oil company, Nilepet, since 2014 (see below). This extensive involvement of the country’s state security services in the oil industry symbolizes the fundamental importance of oil for South Sudan’s economy. Additionally, as described in the section above on the securitization of the state (section VI(A)), the NSS’s has employed its very broad and unchecked powers to detain people perceived to pose a threat to oil production, and to limit reporting and discussion on issues relating to oil production. e) Oil financing the conflict Since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013, significant oil revenues have been channelled into paying for the war effort, depriving key sectors of much needed financing. At the same time, the armed opposition has targeted several of the oil fields, leading to their closure and in some cases damage to the infrastructure. South Sudanese Government officials, have, in their announced plans to revive the oil production, made frequent references to the oil belonging to the people of South Sudan, as explicitly laid down in the Transitional Constitution of 2011 (see below) and the CPA. 1014 Nevertheless, there have been consistent and detailed reports that revenues have been used to benefit members of the political and ethnic elite and their factions for warfare purposes and personal enrichment.1015 A key player in this misappropriation of funds is the state-owned petroleum company Nilepet, which, only in the period between March 2014 and June 2015, is reported to have facilitated the payment of over USD $80 million – of assumed oil revenue – to both official and private actors and organizations, including for the Government’s war-related expenses.1016 Financial and material support, sourced by oil revenue, was reportedly also provided to some of the Government’s proxy militias, involved in the guarding of the oil fields, the above-mentioned Dinka Padang militia. 1017 In March 2018, the US Department of Commerce announced that it had listed all three of South Sudan’s above-mentioned joint ventures, as well as Nilepet and several of its 1010 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 14 December 2018. Confidential Meetings, Juba, 5 December 2018 and 15 January 2019. 1012 Petroleum Act (2012), section 57. 1013 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 17 December 2018; Witness 801, ERN 101530-101541, paras. 7, 9, 17, 20, 23-53; Witness 912, ERN 101674-101704, para. 29: Witness 1031, ERN 102184-102210, para. 73; Global Witness, “Capture on the Nile, South Sudan’s state-owned oil company, Nilepet, has been captured by the country’s predatory elite and security services”, April 2018. 1014 Africa Oil & Power Conference, Juba, November 2018, presentation by Minister of Petroleum of South Sudan; CPA, Chapter III, Sections 1, 3 and 5. 1015 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2018/292, 12 April 2018, paras. 6263. 1016 The Sentry, “Fueling Atrocities, Oil and War in South Sudan”, March 2018, pp. 2-4. 1017 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2016/70, 22 January 2016, para. 56; James, Laura M., “Fields of Control: Oil and (In)security in Sudan and South Sudan”, Small Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment for South Sudan and Sudan, Working Paper 40, 2015, pp.23-24; The Sentry, “Fueling Atrocities, Oil and War in South Sudan”, March 2018, p. 4. 1011 131