A/HRC/40/CRP.1 reached a reported strength of approximately 16,000 men. 1194 These armed fighters brought with them wives, children and assorted Nuer camp-followers. As Riek Machar continued his flight west and south to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, many of the Nuer paused, enjoying the comparative safety of southern Central Equatoria. For many, this pause became permanent.1195 The resulting change to the local demographic mix caused initially by the deployment of Dinka SPLA and Mathiang Anyoor troops, and then the subsequent influx of Nuers from Juba, was to have an enormously de-stabilising effect on the region.1196 The Dinka domination of political and security institutions, 1197 as well as abuses allegedly perpetrated by the SPLA, Mathiang Anyoor, and Nuer in SPLA-IO (RM) against Bari-speaking Equatorian communities including Bari members of SPLA and SPLA-IO (RM) led to the creation of new armed opposition movements in Central Equatoria, notably the National Salvation Front (NAS), led by former SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Logistics Lt. Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka, which emerged in March 2017.1198 The presence of multiple armed groups, many of them insufficiently supplied and resourced, has contributed to rising insecurity and criminality in the area as newly formed armed opposition groups have had relied capturing supplies, ammunition and weapons from other groups in the course of ambushes or fighting. 1199 Such ambushes have continued to occur into 2018.1200 Shortly taking up office in February 2018, the new Governor of Yei River State, Emmanuel Adil Anthony, ordered all County Commissioners to take up office in their counties.1201 Many had previously been staying in Yei, or even Juba, because of the perceived insecurity in their counties, which were partly, or largely, under the control of SPLA-IO (RM).1202 When they relocated to their counties, the Commissioners were accompanied by large security details – essentially SPLA troops dispatched from Juba.1203 The result was further militarization of Yei River State and an increase in localized conflicts with the local civilian population as the newly arrived soldiers foraged for food.1204 As the 2018 peace process leading to the R-ARCSS progressed, many Equatorians felt that it failed to address their demands for accountability for crimes committed in the Equatorias, accountability for land-grabbing, a federal system, security arrangements, and reform “so that it’s not just one tribe [in] command”. 1205 In particular, many Equatorians accuse the Government of failing to deliver on its promise of “real federalism” and of improved power-sharing among all the communities of South Sudan.1206 One former combatant told the Commission: “We are tired of tribal government and we want to fight for federalism”.1207 Land grabbing, initially by Dinka cattle-herders and later also by Nuers, became an additional driver of conflict in Central Equatoria. As a former SPLA-IO commander told the Commission: “we receive no salary, it’s just a sacrifice because of land. If someone grabs your land, where does the next generation will stay? That’s the reason why we fight in Equatorias”.1208 1194 Witness 1050, ERN 102232-102238, para. 9. Confidential Meeting, Juba, 28 November 2018. 1196 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 28 November 2018. 1197 Witness 1050, ERN 102232-102238, para. 12. 1198 Witness 1063, ERN 102249-102253, paras. 10-11; Confidential Meeting, Kampala, 15 December 2018; Human Security Baseline Assessment for South Sudan and Sudan, “Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of ARCSS and the new conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border”, Small Arms Survey, Number 28, May 2017, p. 14. 1199 Witness 1050, ERN 102232-1002238, para. 17; Witness 1063, ERN 102249-102253, para. 8. 1200 See e.g. CTSAMM, Report 2018/01 Violations of the ACOH in the Morobo area, 23 March 2018. 1201 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 28 November 2018. 1202 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 28 November 2018. 1203 Confidential Document, ERN D116365-D116473; Confidential Document, ERN D116703-D116707. 1204 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 27 November 2018. 1205 Witness 1063, ERN 102249-102253, para. 11. 1206 UN Security Council, Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2428 (2018), S/2018/1049, November 2018, para. 32. 1207 Witness 1063, ERN 102249-102253, para. 7. 1208 Witness 1050, ERN 102232-102238, para. 16. 1195 153