A/HRC/21/50 B. Location and access 8. The commission‘s earlier report determined that both the anti- and pro-Government forces could have accessed the two crime scenes – the first scene being the seven Abdulrazzak family homes on Dam Street (Tariq al-Sad) and the second being the two AlSayed family homes on Main Street (Al-Shar‟i Al-Raisi), across the street from the National Hospital (see map). The commission has since determined that the checkpoint at Al-Qaws remained in Government hands at the end of the day the incident occurred. The checkpoint demarcated the new front line between the opposition and Government forces. The commission concluded that Al-Sayed house was adjacent to the National Hospital and lying south of Al-Qaws checkpoint and that the crime scene remained in Government-controlled territory the entire time. Indeed, when UNSMIS arrived the next day and negotiated the handover of the bodies from the site (see the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2012/523, 27 May 2012), Government soldiers were on duty at the checkpoint and in control of the crime scene. 9. In a related finding, the commission ruled out the theory proffered by the Government that the target of the killing was in fact the newly elected Member of Parliament from Taldou, Abdelmuti Mashlab. According to the Government report, The first targets of this massacre were relatives of the People‟s Assembly member Abd Al-Moa‟ti Mashlab. What was required was to take revenge, because he challenged them when he submitted his candidacy to the People‟s Assembly and managed to be elected as a member. This indeed happened before things went out of control and the massacre extended to slaughter other families.g 10. The ―other families‖ are those of Mashlab‘s distant relatives, namely the Al-Sayed family. The commission determined that the Mashlab household was in oppositioncontrolled areas of the town at the time of the attack. Thus it would have been accessible to an anti-Government armed group seeking to mete out such a punishment, yet the house remained untouched. Both Al-Sayed family homes, conversely, were readily accessible to Government forces or local militias, but the same access would have been extremely risky if not impossible for anti-Government groups. 11. At the Abdulrazzak crime scene, where over 60 persons were killed, the commission considered it likely that a large number of perpetrators would have been necessary to carry out the crime. The killings occurred in broad daylight. Testimony received indicated that the perpetrators arrived both by foot and in vehicles, and that some arrived with pickups with machine guns mounted on top, in addition to a number of cars and minivans. The commission found that the movement of vehicles or weapons, as well as the size of the group, would have been detectable by Government forces at the Water Authority position. At the same time, access to the scene for any sizable group of anti-Government armed men would have been practically impossible, especially if they arrived in vehicles as multiple eyewitnesses attested. 12. Opposition members did manage to access the scene and remove the bodies later that evening and apparently did so using vehicles. However, they were apparently shot at by Government forces and had to abandon their efforts until the following morning. g 66 primarily on the same two witnesses as the Government‘s report and not on additional investigation or witnesses in Al-Houla. Moreover, these reports asserted that the Abdulrazzak family had converted to Shiism. The commission confirmed that all members of both families were Sunni and that no one in either family had converted. Note Verbale, 281/2012 of 7 June 2012, p.3 (unofficial translation).