A/HRC/42/40/Add.2 A. Background 13. Following the Maidan events of November 2013 – February 2014, which led to the departure of the incumbent President Yanukovych and a change in Government, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (hereinafter Crimea) were occupied by the Russian Federation in March 2014. In April 2014, anti-Maidan activists, allegedly supported by individuals and groups from the Russian Federation, took control over administrative buildings in a number of regional centres in eastern Ukraine, including Donetsk and Luhansk. On 14 April 2014, an anti-terrorist operation was launched to regain government control over the places controlled by armed groups. On 11 May 2014, armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk organized so-called “referendums” on the “sovereignty” of the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic”, which under Ukrainian law were illegal and failed to meet international standards. Since May 2014, armed groups have been controlling considerable parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In May 2014, Petro Poroshenko was elected the President of Ukraine; in November 2014, the new Verkhovna Rada (parliament) was elected. 14. The hostilities with the armed groups, which from April 2014 were bolstered by the influx of foreign fighters, weapons and ammunition, including from the Russian Federation, rapidly escalated to the level of an armed conflict and had a heavy death toll on civilians. By June 2018, the number of conflict-related civilian deaths exceeded 3,000, and the number of civilian injuries was estimated at between 7,000 and 9,000. Ceasefire and disengagement measures agreed by the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk in September 2014 and in February 2015 (the Minsk agreements), as well as a number of subsequent ceasefire regimes agreed in Minsk contributed to the overall decrease in hostilities, but failed to stop the conflict. In April 2018, the Ukrainian Law “On Particular Aspects of Public Policy Aimed at Safeguarding the Sovereignty of Ukraine over the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine” entered into force. The law refers to the armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and formally assigns the areas in eastern Ukraine that are not controlled by the Government as “under the occupation of the Russian Federation”. The Government of the Russian Federation does not consider itself a party to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, and has consistently denied the presence of regular Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine during the entire period of conflict. 15. Armed conflict in eastern Ukraine heavily affected the situation of people resident in the conflict zone. As at May 2018, more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons were registered with Government, while many choose not to register as such, given the bureaucratic barriers involved and the perceived stigma, as well as the minimal financial support for registered internally displaced persons. Civilians resident in the immediate proximity to the contact line every day face the risk of being shelled or targeted by small arms and light weapons fire, or of tripping a mine or explosive remnant of war; furthermore, their access to social and other services is limited. Numerous families are separated by the contact line, the crossing of which is challenging, if not dangerous. In territory controlled by armed groups, residents are exposed to arbitrariness of various security and “administrative” structures, which has resulted in numerous human rights abuses. International monitors have been repeatedly denied access to places of detention in territory controlled by armed groups. The freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion have been severely muzzled in both Donetsk and Luhansk. 16. Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has carried out a number of institutional reforms, which included the re-establishment of the national police and creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in 2015, of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in 2016, and of the State Bureau of Investigation in 2017 (which became operational in November 2018). In June 2016, a comprehensive judicial reform process was launched to strengthen the independence and accountability of the judiciary. In 2015, the President of Ukraine approved the national human rights strategy; the Government subsequently approved the relevant plan of action for its implementation up to 2020. 5