A/HRC/19/42 the whole population as rights-holders and on States as duty-bearers, a human rights-based approach to the asset recovery process will contribute to remedying some of these barriers. 39. Undoubtedly, there are many instances in which competent agencies from recipient jurisdictions lack the capacity or the legal authority to cooperate without information from the victim country. There are many others, however, where “the interests and perspectives of authorities of recipient countries may be poorly aligned with those of the societies affected by corruption. Consequently, they may either fail to implement portions of the regime, or implement them in ways that are incompatible with the interests of the affected societies”.35 While many of the barriers described in chapter II are related to the failure of both developing and developed countries to make every effort to comply with their obligations under the United Nations Convention against Corruption, it should not be neglected that anti-corruption authorities in developing countries usually face more constraints than those in requested jurisdictions. Thus, while it is not possible to make progress in asset-recovery cases without political will in both the country of origin and the recipient country, the latter country’s authorities are generally in a better position to lower or address the obstacles for the recovery of assets, by taking into account the domestic constraints existing in countries of origin. 40. The following section will outline how this argument applies to the different stages of the asset recovery process. Preventing and detecting 41. Article 52 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption establishes the rules for preventing and detecting transfers of funds of illicit origin. It relies on the legal framework designed to prevent the laundering of the proceeds of crime. This system expects that private financial institutions will organize themselves to comply with “know your customers” rules, perform “ongoing due diligence” on clients that show specific risks, keep records of the transactions, and report suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit, a centralized agency usually empowered with unrestricted access to financial information. This agency must analyze the reported transactions and, if suspicions are confirmed or raised, derive the analysis to law enforcement authorities. 42. However, detection fails when financial intelligence units in developing jurisdictions do not enjoy autonomy, since gatekeepers may be afraid of formal or informal retaliation if reporting transactions of elite members or, in some cases, they may simply find costeffective to launder their money. 36 Thus, as gatekeepers in recipient jurisdictions are less dependent on the political processes of the countries of origin, they are usually more likely to report proceeds of corruption than such a country’s gatekeepers. Nonetheless, as reports are a firstsign, even in these cases either the financial intelligence unit or a prosecutor at the recipient country will need to resort to its respective peer in the country of origin in order to collect evidence for supporting a prima facie case that will eventually lead to the restraint of the assets. In a “low-intensity” democracy, such requests may remain unanswered or only answered in order to reject suspicions when referring to a current public official or a well connected member of the elite. This is why it has been said that “anti-money laundering controls that matter more for developing countries are those that operate in the destination countries”.37 35 36 37 Kevin Davis and others, “Transnational responses to political corruption”, forthcoming, 2012. Michael Levi, “How well do anti-money laundering controls work in developing countries?”, in Reuter (ed.), cited in note 17. Peter Reuter, “Policy and Research Implications of Illicit Flows”, in Reuter (ed.), cited in note 17. 11