A/HRC/19/42 assistance for 2000 – when global attention to asset recovery began5 – and still represents more than 25 per cent of ODA reported for 2010.6 6. By contrast with illicit financial flows originating in organized crime or commercial activities, where around 50 per cent of the money flows between developed countries, in the case of proceeds of corruption 80 per cent of the money is believed to be outflow from developing countries. Given the relative weight of diverted funds in each economy, the impact of outflows of proceeds of corruption substantially increases in the developing world. For instance, in 2002 the African Union estimated the direct and indirect costs of corruption at US$ 148 billion, which at that time amounted to 25 per cent of the continent’s GDP.7 7. Most of the estimated annual outflow of US$ 20-40 billion goes undetected, and even less is repatriated to the countries of origin. Though not intended to be exhaustive, a recent database launched by the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative shows that less than US$ 2 billion had been repatriated since 1990.8 More than 70 per cent of these repatriation efforts took place after the United Nations Convention against Corruption entered into force in 2005, and around US$ 1 billion is currently frozen in ongoing investigations, a figure pointing out a growing rate of detection.9 8. Despite progress made since the United Nations Convention against Corruption entered into force, only around 2 per cent of the estimated funds of illicit origin annually leaving the developing world are repatriated to their countries of origin. 10 B. Legal and factual obstacles to repatriating funds of illicit origin 9. There are multiple legal and factual obstacles to the repatriation of proceeds of corruption.11 Many legal barriers are associated to difficulties in implementing and enforcing the legal framework for preventing and detecting the transfer of proceeds of corruption. For instance, in order to detect these flows, a fundamental standard set by article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption requires State Parties to “take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic law, to require financial institutions within its jurisdiction… to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and their family members and close associates. Such enhanced scrutiny shall be reasonably designed to detect suspicious transactions for the purpose of 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 4 General Assembly resolution 54/205, of 27 January.2000, on “Prevention of corrupt practices and illegal transfer of funds”. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac . African Development Bank Group, “Proceedings of the regional learning workshop on combating corruption in Africa” (2003). Available at: http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/queryattach/q44Addisreport.pdf. Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative launched Asset Recovery Watch in October 2011. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/stararw.html . Asset Recovery Watch. Available at http://assetrecoverywatch.worldbank.org/ . These figures do not consider the funds frozen and/or returned to Egypt, Tunisia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya in 2011, a process that has renewed asset-recovery efforts. Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, “Barriers to Asset Recovery: An Analysis of the Key Barriers and Recommendations for Action” (Washington D.C., 2011), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/publications/barriers.html .