A/HRC/4/20 page 11 37. Proponents of “mercy killings” often justify them out of compassion, but in practice they are much more likely to reflect an underlying dehumanization of the enemy. For example, Iraqis who witnessed the shootings by Alban and Horne said that “rather than provide medical help to an injured civilian, the soldiers had treated the Iraqi as if he were an animal struck by a car”.50 38. It warrants underlining the fact that international humanitarian law does not allow - under any circumstances - the taking of the life of another as a purported act of “mercy”. The obligation to treat injured soldiers “humanely” and the obligation to “respect and protect” the wounded are incompatible with the idea of “mercy killings”. Rather, the obligation of parties to a conflict, in the presence of injured persons, is (i) to “take all possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without adverse distinction”51 and (ii) to seek the appropriate medical care to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay.52 Individual parties to the conflict, who lack medical training, may not take the medical care of the wounded into their own hands by deciding to end the life of an injured person on the battlefield. Such killings are an unequivocal violation of international humanitarian law. C. Imposing the death penalty only for the “most serious crimes” 39. International human rights law provides that States which retain the death penalty can only impose it for “the most serious crimes”. That phrase has thus assumed major importance in efforts to determine when the death penalty might acceptably be imposed. While its precise meaning has not been spelled out in treaty form, the debates over its drafting, principles of interpretation adopted subsequently, and the by now very extensive practice of international human rights mechanisms have all combined to clarify the meaning and significance of the phrase. 40. The first Special Rapporteur dealt with the issue of the “most serious crimes” as early as 1984 when he surveyed the death penalty legislation of States to assess the range of offences for which it was then imposed in practice.53 The results of the survey contributed to the elaboration of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, which were adopted by the Economic and Social Council later that year.54 In his next report, the Special Rapporteur noted that these safeguards would “serve as criteria for ascertaining whether an execution is of a summary or arbitrary nature”,55 and he began to consider particular situations implicating the most serious crimes limitation.56 In subsequent reports, the Special Rapporteur drew on the safeguards and their follow-up by the Council as well as on the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in determining whether particular offences fell within or outside the scope of the “most serious crimes” requirement.57 In communications with Governments, the Special Rapporteur has addressed death sentences for offences and conduct including58 adultery,59 apostasy,60 blasphemy,61 bribery,62 acts incompatible with chastity,63 corruption,64 drug possession,65 drug trafficking,66 drug-related offences,67 economic offences,68 expressing oneself,69 holding an opinion,70 homosexual acts,71 matters of sexual orientation,72 manifesting one’s religion or beliefs,73 prostitution,74 organization of prostitution,75 participation in protests,76 premarital sex,77 singing songs inciting men to go to war,78 sodomy,79 speculation,80 “acts of treason, espionage or other vaguely defined acts usually described as ‘crimes against the State’”,81 and writing slogans against a country’s