A/HRC/4/20 page 26 83 The provisions protecting the right to life in the American Convention on Human Rights also specify that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (art. 4(1)) and that the death penalty “may be imposed only for the most serious crimes” (art. 4(2)) but also states that, “In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes” (art. 4(4)). With respect to the African regional human rights system, “Although the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights is silent on the subject of capital punishment, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has called upon states that maintain the death penalty to ‘limit the imposition of the death penalty only to the most serious crimes’.” William A. Schabas, “International law and the death penalty: reflecting or promoting change?”, in Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition (eds. Hodgkinson & Schabas 2004), p. 46. 84 See Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1987), pp. 113-145. 85 See, e.g., E/CN.4/SR.152, paras. 12-13 (“His delegation’s view [was] that the word ‘law’, as understood in the covenant, referred exclusively to laws which were not contrary to the principles of the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights]. … Unless such a formula was included, the text of article 5 [now 6] would be acceptable to any dictator, as there would be nothing to prevent him from enacting laws contrary to the spirit of the Declaration.”); E/CN.4/SR.140, para. 38 (“[T]he greatest danger to be guarded against was that of actions of the State against the individual. … Comparatively primitive and incautious in their methods until recently, totalitarian states had since become very careful to preserve an appearance of legality while arbitrarily killing their opponents.”). 86 A/2929, p. 83, para. 3. See also Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary (2nd revised ed. 2005), pp. 127-128: “Although the term ‘arbitrarily’ was criticized as too vague, the HRComm [Human Rights Commission] ultimately opted for it after lengthy discussion. … [In the Third Committee of the General Assembly:] Despite strong criticism of the vagueness of the word ‘arbitrarily’ and a Dutch proposal that Art. 6 be drafted along the same lines as Art. 2 of the ECHR, the majority insisted on the formulation adopted by the HRComm, even though its meaning had not been clarified. Several delegates took the opinion that arbitrarily was synonymous with the term ‘without due process of law’ common in Anglo-American law. Others argued that it contained an ethical component, since national legislation could also be arbitrary. The Committee of Experts, which had taken up the interpretation of this term at the request of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, concurred with the view of the Chilean delegate in the HRComm that arbitrary deprivation of life contained elements of unlawfulness and injustice, as well as those of capriciousness and unreasonableness.” 87 A/2929, pp 83-84. The recognition that a death sentence cannot be imposed “contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” indicates another key limitation on what may constitute a capital crime. Under international law, each individual may as of right exercise liberty of movement; choose his or her own residence; leave any country; enjoy individual and family privacy; think freely, adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice; manifest his or her religion or belief in worship,