A/HRC/13/65 page 9 24. By mid-2009, over 11,000 children were enrolled in community schools in Mogadishu and 33,000 in Afgoye, the two most war-affected regions in Somalia. This was a 100 per cent increase in enrolment since the end of 2008 and was possible largely because most of the actors involved had cooperated. There is also significant community support for UNICEF activities, even in war-affected areas. Such experience shows that community-based approaches have a better chance of success in Somalia. There is a need, therefore, to involve the people and civil society in finding solutions to the country’s long-standing problems. 25. Developments in relation to food security, particularly in the context of drought in some areas of the south-central region, are matters of serious concern. The situation is compounded by restrictions imposed by Al-Shabaab on the World Food Programme (WFP), resulting in the suspension of its humanitarian assistance programme for vulnerable populations. This suspension was triggered by the Al-Shabaab attack on WFP offices in August 2009 in Buale and Wajid, where seven international staff were posted. Thereafter, WFP continued working using national staff only; however, new developments soon led to their withdrawal as well. 26. Following the above incident, an 11-point list of demands was issued by Al-Shabaab, which included a number of restrictions to be placed on the local population. These included banning of women from working for the United Nations and payment of USD 30,000 every six months for the security of United Nations staff. The United Nations as a whole rejected these conditions. As a result, the central shura of Al-Shabaab issued a directive whereby, as from 1 January 2010, no food would be allowed in from abroad. Only locally procured food would be permitted. On 18 December 2009, WFP decided to suspend its operation in the south-central region. 27. An important development in recent months has been the emergence of new group dynamics of the Islamist forces. The conflict between clan dynamics and the moderate Sufi tradition of Islam, on the one hand, and the stern Wahabi/Salafi tradition of Islam that was being imposed in urban areas by jihadists from outside, on the other, are important elements to bear in mind in understanding the evolving situation in south-central Somalia. 28. Two new dimensions are being introduced by the Islamist forces to the conflict in Somalia: international jihad elements in Somalia are being linked to the Al-Huti insurrection in Yemen and the Al-Quds Brigade of Palestine; and jihad is being used as a political tool and the AlShabaab operations are being professionalized. Their operations are now planned well in advance and implemented with greater precision and brutality. Such professionalism was not present in 2008. 29. Al-Shabaab appears to be operating not just within the traditional clan system in Somalia but also by accommodating minorities that lack the protection of the major clans. It is also promoting inter-ethnic marriages. Its ally Hizbul Islam controls access to the Afgoye Corridor. It also controls the port city of Kismayo and is generating income by imposing local taxes and levies on the international khat trade. Al-Shabaab’s relationship with the local population varies from location to location. Although it has managed to gain support of the local population in many places, its extreme interpretation of sharia law (including corporal punishment imposed through summary, if any, proceedings and the strictest dress code), have alienated the sympathy of women in particular. It has taken over United Nations property and premises in many places and is doing business with its equipment. There are indications that Al-Shabaab is cash-starved.