A/HRC/6/14 page 12 37. The use of lethal force by law enforcement officials from 26 to 29 September 2007 in Myanmar was inconsistent with the fundamental principles reflected in the basic international norms deriving from international customary law.3 They ignored the principles of necessity and proportionality which are included in article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and its commentary. Article 3 states that: “Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” The commentary appended to this provision explains that “in no case should this provision be interpreted to authorize the use of force which is disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved”. Similarly, in the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the most general statement on the use of lethal force, principle 9, provides that: “In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” Whereas the Myanmar Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the use of civil force (art. 128) and military force (art. 129) to disperse an assembly, it also provides for the use of as little force as is consistent with dispersing an assembly, in order to avoid “injury to person and property” (art. 130). From 26 to 29 September, the security forces without doubt exceeded the limits of the power conferred on them by the law. 38. The Special Rapporteur found that whereas the Government and its agents showed some diligence in preventing a massacre, the decision by the security forces to shoot to kill and to severely beat protesters causing death constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life and violates the right to life, as the lethal force used was unnecessary and disproportionate. B. The use of non law enforcement officials 39. The Special Rapporteur considers that the participation of USDA members and SAS militia largely contributed to the excessive use of force against the peaceful protesters. It is unfortunate that the Myanmar Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the use by the authorities of civil forces to disperse assemblies (art. 128). In addition to Government soldiers and riot police, members of the Government-backed USDA and Swan Ah Shin (SAS) militia took violent action against the protesters with Government acquiescence or approval. Whether this group acted on direct Government orders is not clear. There is evidence that the Myanmar authorities have been complicit in the abuses perpetrated by these groups, or negligent in failing to intervene, punish or prevent them. 40. The USDA was established by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1993 and in 2006 announced its intention to become a political party and field candidates in the next election. The Special Rapporteur expressed concerns in his previous reports over various allegations of involvement by members of USDA in acts of political and criminal violence. The existence of the SAS was first reported in 2003 when they were allegedly involved in the tragic incident of Depayin.4 According to sources, the SAS was reportedly already involved in 3 The principles of international human rights law applicable in such contexts draw significantly upon the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. 4 The Depayin massacre occurred on 30 May 2003, when at least 70 people associated with the NLD were allegedly killed by a Government-sponsored mob.