A/HRC/13/63 page 17 B. Reforming the security sector 63. In their initial report, the experts emphasized the need for comprehensive security sector reform, starting by removing perpetrators of serious human rights violations identified as such from their posts without further delay.22 However, contrary to the Government’s “zero tolerance” policy, FARDC officers and soldiers implicated in human rights violations continue to be present in the Armed Forces, including in highranking positions. 64. In January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda was promoted to the rank of general in the context of the rapprochement with CNDP, even though nine months earlier the International Criminal Court had published an arrest warrant for war crimes against him.23 During the Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review in November and December 2009, the Government explicitly rejected the recommendation that Ntaganda should be arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court.24 Despite Government assurances that Ntaganda no longer exercises command functions within FARDC, reports indicate that he remains involved in the FARDC command structure, including in the context of the Kimia II operation.25 65. In March 2009, the Government appointed Jean-Pierre Biyoyo as a colonel in FARDC. Two years earlier, Biyoyo had been found guilty of recruiting child soldiers by a Congolese military court and later escaped from prison. 66. The Government appears unwilling to create structures to identify and remove perpetrators of human rights violations. In their initial report, the experts recommended setting up a comprehensive and adequately resourced secondary screening mechanism, where each officer’s past human rights record and his ability to command in accordance with principles of international humanitarian law and the values embodied in the Constitution is subject to review.26 Even though this recommendation mirrors repeated calls of the Security Council,27 it has not been implemented. The Government explicitly rejected recommendations to establish an effective human rights vetting mechanism during the Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review.28 67. Emphasizing the need for comprehensive training programmes that systematically cover international humanitarian and human rights law, the experts also recommended that donors make the extension of programmes contingent on serious 22 A/HRC/10/59, para. 97. 23 In August 2006, an International Criminal Court pretrial chamber confirmed the arrest warrant, which was issued under seal and only made public in April 2008. 24 See A/HRC/WG.6/6/L.7, para. 97. 25 See S/2009/623, para. 43. 26 See A/HRC/10/59, para. 97. 27 See S/RES/1906 (2009), para. 32, and S/RES/1856 (2008), para. 22. 28 See A/HRC/WG.6/6/L.7, para. 97.