A/HRC/37/72 B. Internment by Syrian Democratic Forces 12. All individuals who fled from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr were forced to reside within fenced, camp-like sites in al-Sad, Mabrouka, and Ain Issa while their identification documents were assessed for individual vetting. Families with identifying documents issued by ISIL were disproportionally affected however, as SDF authorities did not recognise these documents as legitimate which led to more prolonged vetting periods. The transit time for vetting procedures averaged between a few days to eight weeks, though internally displaced persons were not made aware any details of the underlying process. Once cleared, only those individuals or families who were able to locate a kafīl or “guarantor” in Kurdishheld areas were authorised to leave the camps towards those areas. Similar requirements of “guarantors” were imposed for onward movement towards FSA-held Jarablus (northern Aleppo). The desolate locations of camps and confiscation of mobile phones by SDF soldiers in some camps complicated opportunities to secure a “guarantor” for many internally displaced persons. Many others had no choice but to head west towards Idlib, while SDF have forced some families to return to Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr after landmine clearances. 13. Internment, or administrative detention, for the purposes of vetting civilians believed to pose a security threat may only be justified when absolutely necessary to address “imperative reasons of security”,5 and a case-by-case evaluation must take place in relation to every individual prior to detaining him or her. The internment of civilians may not be used solely for interrogation or intelligence gathering. All internees must have been informed promptly, in a language he or she understood, of the reasons for internment, and all had the right to challenge, with the least possible delay, the lawfulness of his or her detention in these camps. The review of lawfulness of internment must be carried out by an independent and impartial body. 6 14. The threat of ISIL attacks against Kurdish-held areas was exemplified on 3 May, when ISIL militants attacked Rajm as-Salibi camp (Hasakah) just before dawn, killing at least 30 civilians including women and children. Similarly, on 12 October, ISIL militants detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices at Al-Malha checkpoint in Abu Fas village, bordering Hasakah and Dayr el-Zawr, where approximately 7,000 internally displaced persons were gathered for initial SDF screening. The suicide attack killed 40 internally displaced persons, including women and children, and injured dozens of others. Several suspected ISIL terrorists have since been identified as a result of SDF-run vetting. The SDF is currently detaining nearly 1,400 “terrorist” fighters, primarily ISIL militants identified as such, including hundreds of foreign fighters from up to 30 countries.7 15. Irrespective of this threat, the blanket internment of all civilians from Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr cannot be justified by SDF. Among those civilians currently interned are women, children, elderly, infirm, disabled persons, and others who did not represent an imperative security threat and whose continued detention is manifestly unnecessary on any grounds. In many instances, the on-going internment of these individuals amounts to arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and therefore the unlawful confinement of tens of thousands of individuals.8 5 7 8 The Commission concurs with the International Committee of the Red Cross that “both customary and treaty international humanitarian law contain an inherent power to intern”, and considers “imperative reasons of security” the permissible grounds standard applicable to situations of noninternational armed conflict. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Commentary of 2016, Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International Character, at para. 728, available at www.ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA4 90736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC. 6 Ibid. at. para. 723. PEOPLE’S DEFENSE UNITS, 2017 Balance Sheet of War — Syrian Democratic Forces, 3 January 2018, available at www.ypgrojava.org/2017-Balance-Sheet-of-War-%E2%80%93-Syrian-DemocraticForces, Press Release. As Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions is silent on the procedural safeguards for persons interned in non-international armed conflict, the Commission applies core human rights obligations to 29