A/HRC/43/56 Dinka language and saying they didn’t want the Luo there . . .”150 The witness further recounted how the cattle keepers arrived in the village brandishing AK-47s and PKMs which they used to kill at least 11 people near a school before looting all of the food in the village.151 Other witnesses indicated that SSPDF Division 5 soldiers who were present failed to intervene during the attack, but came to collect the dead bodies afterwards. 152 21. In several such incidents documented by the Commission, eyewitnesses had previously interacted with the cattle keepers and were able to identify by name the cattle camps and individuals who carried out the attacks on their villages. 153 Additionally, several interlocutors indicated the cattle being migrated belonged to high-ranking Government officials154 who had engaged the cattle keepers to guard their cattle and provided them with ammunition and small-arms, as well as heavy weapons such as PKMs and RPGs. 155 Soldiers from SSPDF Division 5 reportedly played a key role in arming the cattle keepers from Tonj as they were from the same Dinka ethnic group. 156 The Commission also received information about County Commissioners and a high-ranking government official allegedly opening the stores from previous disarmament initiatives to provide cattle keepers weapons.157 22. Local communities informed Commission investigators that by August 2019, youth self-defence groups had emerged to protect themselves and their communities against such attacks.158 Youth were able to purchase their weapons from SSPDF soldiers who needed the income because they had not been paid their salaries. 159 One youth leader told the Commission he had purchased his AK-47 from an SSPDF soldier for 60,000 SSP.160 23. As the SPLA-IO (RM) Division 6a forces were accused of being involved in counterattacks against the cattle keepers and other members of the Dinka community, 161 the Commission observed that Government security forces began to target Luo youth, often accusing them of being rebels which in turn led some of these youth to seek protection by joining the armed opposition group.162 In other instances, Luo commanders affiliated with SPLA-IO (RM) sought to avenge attacks which involved their community by recruiting, at times forcefully, from among the youth, in violation of the cessation of hostilities agreement.163 24. Between 3 and 6 July 2019, a Tri-State Peace Conference was held between Gogrial (Warrap), Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal) and Tonj (Warrap) where members signed a deal resolving to cease hostilities and conduct comprehensive disarmament. 25. With respect to the administration of justice, witnesses and victims appeared most concerned that the compensation mechanisms in the Marial Bai Agreement and the Tri- 150 ERN 102627 - 102631; and ERN 102609 - 102617, paras. 12-15. ERN 102627 - 102631, paras. 5-6; ERN 102632 - 102652. 152 ERN 103249 - 103254; ERN 102627 - 102631, para. 9; ERN 102609 - 102617, paras. 12-15; and ERN D120820 - 120826. 153 ERN 102689 - 102690, paras. 9-20; ERN 102594 - 102600, paras. 10-13; ERN 102699 - 102706, para. 13; ERN 102627 - 102631, para. 5; ERN 102664 - 102670, paras. 9-14; ERN 102618 - 102626, para. 10; ERN 102707 - 102717, paras. 9-10. 154 ERN 103358 - 103367, para. 7; ERN 102872 - 102876, para. 13; Confidential meeting, 6 July 2019. 155 ERN 103249 - 103254; ERN 102872 - 102876. 156 ERN 103249 - 103254; ERN 102797 - 102802, paras. 8-11; ERN 102872 - 102876, paras. 14-15; ERN 102632 - 102652, para. 22; and Confidential meeting, 6 July 2019. 157 ERN 102850 - 102857, paras. 11-12; ERN 102797 - 102802, paras. 8-9; ERN 102803 - 102810, paras. 13-14. 158 Investigator’s Report; Confidential meeting, 9 July 2019. 159 ERN 102850 - 102857, para. 11-12. 160 ERN D120820 - 120826. 161 See, e.g., ERN 102546 - 102552; ERN 102580 - 102596, para. 7-13; ERN 102587 - 102593; ERN 102563 - 102568. 162 ERN 102872 - 102876, para. 17; ERN 102632 - 102652, paras. 25-31; Confidential meeting, 9 July 2019. 163 ERN 102632 - 102652, para. 32; ERN 102618 - 102626, para. 15-17. 151 31