A/HRC/28/69 26. In 2014, terrorist groups used suicide and car bombs in Homs and Hama governorates. Unlike the earlier bombings of 2011 and 2012, most of which were directed against military targets, the bombings in 2013 and 2014 targeted civilians. 27. In late 2014, there was an increase in ground attacks on villages that were home to minority groups perceived to be supporting the Government. 28. Anti-Government armed groups lost momentum when the Government, assisted by Hizbullah, began to regain control of Al Qusayr (Homs) in June 2013. Since then, the groups have continued to lose ground owing to a lack of regular and consistent support, inadequate unity and cohesion, and increased infighting, in particular after the emergence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS)6 in April 2013. (i) Jabhat Al-Nusra 29. The emergence of Jabhat Al-Nusra as an offshoot of Al-Qaida in Iraq was announced in January 2012. Owing to its tactical efficiency and consistent logistic capabilities, the group rapidly gained prominence among the other anti-government armed groups, increasingly attracting both extremist backers and foreign fighters. 30. While Jabhat Al-Nusra has made extensive use of car bombs and suicide bombings against military targets, such as military and security forces, it has also detonated bombs in civilian areas, particularly in Homs city in 2014. Jabhat Al-Nusra has also launched ground attacks on civilian localities. Acting in concert with other armed groups, it participated in the massacres of civilians in Rif Damascus in December 2013, and in Hama on 24 December 2013 and 9 February 2014. 31. In April 2013, the leadership of Jabhat Al-Nusra rejected a merger with ISIS. After months of intense confrontations, Al-Nusra was driven out of its strongholds in Dayr az Zawr in July 2014, losing significant oil resources and tribal support. 32. Relations between Jabhat Al-Nusra and other armed groups remained largely collaborative. However, the Al-Qaida affiliate recently attacked a number of westernbacked armed factions in Idlib governorate, absorbing their equipment, fighters and territory. (ii) Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham 33. In April 2013, following the breakdown of its alliance with Jabhat Al-Nusra, ISIS developed into a well-organized, dominant armed force in control of extensive territory in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, posing a significant threat to peace and stability. 34. In 2014, the conflict was marked by the rapid rise and expansion of ISIS, which took over large parts of the north-east in the Syrian Arab Republic. It has recently made inroads in Hama and Homs governorates. In June 2014, ISIS proclaimed itself a “caliphate”. 35. This terrorist group has gained control over significant economic resources and, with them, a stable source of funding. By using tactics that instil terror among the civilian population, and providing basic services, it has fostered loyalties among local communities in the areas it controls. 36. ISIS operates a harsh, rigid administrative system that comprises the Al-Hisbah morality police, the general police force, courts and entities managing recruitment, tribal relations and education.7 6 7 6 Also referred to as “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL). See A/HRC/27/CRP.3, para. 16.