A/HRC/37/63 highlighted early on in the history of the mandate. In his 2013 report to the General Assembly, the Independent Expert recommended the reactivation of the Trusteeship Council in order to advance the self-determination of many indigenous and non-selfgoverning peoples. He also proposed that the Special Committee on Decolonization and other United Nations organs accept and review communications sent to them by indigenous and unrepresented peoples, with reference to chapter XI of the Charter. Moreover, the General Assembly was encouraged to amend its rules and procedures to allow for greater participation of indigenous and non-represented peoples in international debates. 31. More generally, an epistemological obstacle persists concerning the postulate of a hierarchy of human rights as one of the remaining ideological debates between developed and developing countries. It is the considered view of the Independent Expert that civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights are not only interdependent, but they also have equal value and importance (see annex I below). 32. A democratic and equitable international order can only flourish in a peaceful environment. With conflict prevention being the overarching raison d’être of the United Nations, the hundreds of wars since 1945 indicate that the Organization must reform in order to live up to its purposes and principles. For that reason, war and war-mongering (prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter and article 20 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) must be banned. Moreover, the so-called “responsibility to protect doctrine” should be discarded and replaced by the principle of the responsibility to act in the public interest (see A/HRC/33/40, paras. 13–17). The responsibility to protect should not be seen as replacing the jus cogens prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Furthermore, under no condition should it be tolerated that a State unilaterally invoke the right to protect without Security Council approval. Instead, the Independent Expert has proposed that a standing group — administered by the United Nations and deployed by the Security Council, which receives its troops and support from current Security Council members — is ready for rapid deployment in the event of violations of Article 2 (4) or future grave human rights abuses.18 33. The Independent Expert has also illustrated the relationship between aspirations for fulfilment of the right of self-determination and present-day challenges to peace and security (A/69/272). As a point of fact, the post-colonial world left a legacy of frontiers that do not correspond to ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic criteria. This has been a continuing source of tension that may require adjustment in keeping with Article 2 (3) of the Charter. The doctrine of uti possidetis is obsolete and its maintenance in the twenty-first century without the possibility of peaceful adjustments may perpetuate human rights violations. Thus, the implementation of the right of self-determination is not exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned, but is a legitimate concern of the international community. 18 See the debate in the General Assembly on 23 July 2009, summarized in my 2012 report to the Assembly (A/67/277). Contrary to some trends and perceptions, the idea of the responsibility to protect, contained in General Assembly resolution 60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome), did not replace the Charter-mandated international law of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States. The responsibility to protect is not a lex specialis that derogates from Article 2 (3), (4) and (7) or any other provision of the Charter. The principle of non-intervention remains very much valid and is confirmed in countless resolutions of the Assembly and the Human Rights Council. Therefore, responsibility to protect cannot circumvent the Charter or engage in sabre-rattling or propaganda for war. At the plenary debate on the responsibility to protect, the President of the Assembly identified four benchmark questions that should determine whether and when the system of collective security could invoke the responsibility to protect: (a) Do the rules apply in principle, and is it likely that they will be applied in practice equally to all States, or, in the nature of things, is it more likely that the principle would be applied only by the strong against the weak? (b) Will the adoption of the responsibility to protect principle in the practice of collective security be more likely to enhance or undermine respect for international law? (c) Is the doctrine of responsibility to protect necessary and, conversely, does it guarantee that States will intervene to prevent another situation like the one that occurred in Rwanda? (d) Does the international community have the capacity to enforce accountability upon those who might abuse the right that the responsibility to protect principle would give States to resort to the use of force against other States? 11