A/HRC/38/38 guarantee a plural and balanced composition (see A/HRC/11/41, paras. 24–30 and 97). Similar considerations have been included in previous reports on judicial accountability (see A/HRC/26/32, paras. 88–93 and 125–126) and continuing education for judges (see A/HRC/14/26, para. 53), as well as in a number of country mission reports (e.g. A/HRC/35/31/Add.1, A/HRC/32/34/Add.1, A/HRC/23/43/Add.3 and A/HRC/23/43/ Add.1). 18. However, the creation of a judicial council is not in itself sufficient to ensure judicial independence and promote judicial accountability. In order to enable a council to play its role of guarantor of judicial independence, it is important to ensure that it is granted extensive powers in all aspects relating to judicial careers, and that its institutional structure and composition contribute to the insulation of the judiciary and judicial career processes from external political pressure. 19. In a number of mission reports, the Special Rapporteur and his predecessors identified serious flaws in the structure, composition and responsibilities of judicial councils that undermined their ability to promote judicial independence (see, for example, the reports on Poland (A/HRC/38/38/Add.1, paras. 63–70 and 85); Guinea Bissau (A/HRC/32/34/Add.1, paras. 11, 35–36 and 110); Maldives (A/HRC/23/43/Add.3, paras. 44–47 and 99); and El Salvador (A/HRC/23/43/Add.1, paras. 49, 51–55, 61–63, 113 and 119)). In these and other cases, the creation of a judicial council has not led to substantial improvements in the insulation of the judiciary from political control and interferences. 20. In the present report, the Special Rapporteur assesses existing international and regional standards relating to judicial councils or equivalent independent and autonomous bodies established at the national level to promote and strengthen the independence of the judiciary. The aim is not to identify an “ideal model” of judicial council or to provide a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of these institutions in securing judicial independence and accountability. Based on the contributions received, the report seeks to define common principles for ensuring the independence of such bodies, where they exist, and to identify good practices relating to their mission, composition and functions. III. Legal standards A. International standards 21. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary list the measures that States are required to adopt to guarantee the independence of the judiciary at the national level. They require that the independence of the judiciary be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country, and reaffirm that it is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary (principle 1). They also include specific provisions concerning the status of judges, including their independence and impartiality (principles 2 and 4), qualification and appointment (principle 10), conditions of service and remuneration (principle 11), security of tenure (principle 12), promotion (principle 13), assignment of cases (principle 14) and disciplinary proceedings against judges (principles 17 to 20). However, the Basic Principles do not include any specific provision concerning the establishment of judicial councils. 22. At the global level, only the revised Universal Charter of the Judge provides for the establishment of “a Council for the Judiciary, or another equivalent body … save in countries where this independence is traditionally ensured by other means” and includes specific provisions relating to the composition and competences of this body in the fields of recruitment, training, appointment, promotion and discipline of judges.4 4 Universal Charter of the Judge, approved by the Central Council of the International Association of Judges in Taipei, Taiwan Province of China on 17 November 1999 and updated in Santiago on 14 November 2017. 5