A/HRC/45/7 indicate that the Committee and its Executive Directorate have not achieved their full potential in this regard.62 69. The Special Rapporteur would also find it desirable to engage with the Office of the Ombudsperson of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), AlQaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as the Office considers requests from individuals and other subjects of the Committee’s targeted sanctions that petition for delisting. While the Ombudsperson has strived to work transparently and reach fair conclusions, questions have been raised by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism about the adequacy of due process guarantees in the procedures. The Ombudsperson and the Focal Point for Delisting, while dealing mostly with counter-terrorism sanctions, may provide models for the involvement of the United Nations in dealing with sanctions more generally, including unilateral ones. 70. Although the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime does not impose or manage sanctions, the States that benefit from its support often use targeted financial sanctions in their efforts to curtail criminal activity. The Special Rapporteur believes it would be useful to develop cooperation with this Office to reinforce States’ consideration of the human rights consequences of enacting and implementing sanctions. 71. The Special Rapporteur would also deem it important to develop a cooperative relationship with the Department of Peace Operations and the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations as States increasingly hold a favourable view of sanctions as a way to restore peace and security following armed conflict. Such sanctions are typically applied against military officers and others who violate peace agreements or otherwise undermine post-conflict stability. 72. The Special Rapporteur believes that active interaction with other parts of the United Nations human rights system is vital for effectively protecting the rights of those affected by the application of unilateral sanctions. The Special Rapporteur plans to open information-exchange channels with the treaty bodies that monitor the implementation of the main international human rights conventions. She believes that the treaty bodies can be key intermediaries for providing guidance and advice to States on their use of sanctions in the context of implementing human rights treaties. 73. The Special Rapporteur looks forward to cooperating closely with the other special rapporteurs, independent experts and working groups on many levels with respect to her mandate’s focus on unilateral coercive measures, when such measures affect the rights they oversee under their respective mandates. The Special Rapporteur believes the focus of her mandate provides the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights with a unique vantage point insofar as sanctions can affect a wide range of human rights and insofar as this unique vantage point can be leveraged to the advantage of the Office’s work more generally. 74. The Special Rapporteur will endeavour to develop communications with the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, who is the officer responsible for overseeing the overall role of the United Nations in fulfilling the Organization’s responsibility to protect, as the application of unilateral sanctions can undermine the ability of States to meet their responsibilities in that regard towards their own populations. 75. The Special Rapporteur insists that economic sanctions today can often be qualified as unilateral coercive measures that undermine normal inter-State relations and the rule of law and that bear enormous humanitarian costs. The Special Rapporteur appreciates that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations consider issues pertaining to sanctions as part of their ongoing examination, entrusted by the General Assembly, of how the United Nations can improve 62 See, e.g., A/HRC/34/61 and A/HRC/40/52. 13