A/HRC/32/39 1. Monitoring the use of force 106. Often the first step in any process of accountability is effective monitoring of levels of use of force. That necessary step remains sadly incomplete in many contexts with respect to the use of force by State law enforcement. However it is even less complete in the case of the use of force by private security providers. That data gap fundamentally undermines the work of national and international efforts to ensure accountability for human rights abuses. 107. In order for any organization that uses or potentially uses force for the purpose of security provision demonstrably to respect the right to life, there must be a system of mandatory reporting of all incidents involving the use of firearms, all deaths, and any serious injuries.39 It is good practice that such a system also requires mandatory reporting of potentially lethal incidents. 2. Accountability under international law 108. While States play the primary role in international law, particularly with regard to law-making and international legal responsibility, and while the regulation and scrutiny of the private security sector may primarily be a question for domestic law, that does not mean there can be no international element.40 International human rights law does not exclusively govern the conduct of States; it has been variously confirmed that it is the nature of the conduct, and not the entity, that will determine whether or not international human rights law is applicable.41 109. Against the backdrop of uncertainty around the exact role that corporations play in the international legal context, there is consensus that corporations should at the very least respect human rights.42 There is increasing support for the view that non-State collective entities have a binding obligation to obey jus cogens and not to engage in conduct amounting to international crimes (see, for example, A/HRC/19/69, para. 106). Along with that come links between human rights and corporate social responsibility, which incentivizes companies to take into account principles that include human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. 110. Under current best practice, unlawful conduct on the part of private security providers is addressed either directly through international corporate social responsibility frameworks and voluntary, self-regulatory codes of conduct aimed at implementing the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, or by holding States accountable where they fail to provide realistic options to hold private security providers and individual personnel accountable under domestic civil and criminal law. 111. Of the voluntary frameworks perhaps most notable is the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, which seeks to facilitate access to remedy through the creation of its independent governance and oversight mechanism, as well as the 39 40 41 42 18 See the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, principles 6, 11(f) and 22. R. Steinhardt, “Weapons and the human rights responsibilities of multinational corporations”, in Weapons Under International Human Rights Law, S. Casey-Maslen, ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 509 and 513-514. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1995), cert. denied 518 US 1005 (1996); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 725 (2004), p. 748. N. Pillay “The corporate responsibility to respect: a human rights milestone”, International Labour and Social Policy Review (Geneva, 2009), pp. 63-68.