A/HRC/3/2 page 36 out. Further inquiry into the incident following information from UNIFIL has concluded that the movement was of a convoy that had left Marjayoun earlier. It is important to note that a request for the passage of the convoy was submitted to IDF coordination apparatuses prior to its departure and was not authorized. Furthermore a curfew103 has been placed on any non-authorized vehicular movement south of the Litani River several days ago.104 131. This justification raises major problems. The curfew imposed by IDF south of the Litani River had the effect of stripping civilians travelling in the south of their protected status and turning them into military targets. The fact that a civilian stayed or moved within that zone did not mean that he was participating directly in hostilities. The precautions taken by IDF fell far below the requirements as set forth in international humanitarian law, which would have required a careful assessment, taking into account the conditions governing this particular situation, as to whether there were sufficient indications to warrant an attack. 132. Again in Marwaheen, another convoy faced an IDF attack on 16 July. Further to the request made by the IDF for the population to leave town, on 15 July UNIFIL discussed plans for an evacuation convoy. On 16 July an IDF clearance was obtained and the UNIFIL convoy of four buses, four or five trucks, two APCs and two Military Police vehicles left Naqoura at 0715 hours, reaching Marwaheen at 0900 hours. By 1100 hours, the local people who wanted to leave were ready and UNIFIL Naqoura had approved the additional evacuation of people from the village of Um al Tut, near Marwaheen. By 1115, when the UNIFIL convoy had reached the Military Observers patrol base, UNIFIL Operations informed the convoy that IDF clearance had been revoked and the Military Observers suggested that the convoy return to the village. At about 1300 hours, two rockets were launched towards Israel, from a distance from the village. 133. At approximately 1400 hours, UNIFIL Operations informed the convoy that they had obtained new clearance from IDF. The first vehicle had reached a house across the street from the mosque, when a first round hit the roof of the house, ricocheted and fell in front of the vehicle. In all, six rounds hit the same house.105 People then got out of the buses and gathered in the central square for protection. A report was made to UNIFIL Operations to inform IDF and request immediate cessation of fire. After 10-30 minutes, a second attack took place, including another six to seven smoke shell rounds launched around the same house. Again, a report was sent to UNIFIL Operations. At about 1730 hours, the convoy was able to leave for Tyre. One old man succumbed to a heart attack as a result of the choking smoke. No one else was hurt in the incident. 134. Smoke shells of this type are designed to provide a smoke screen for troops or tanks, rather than to kill. This attack appears to be an attempt to panic the civilians. There is no military justification for such an action. 135. The Commission notes that civilian convoys have repeatedly been the target of military attacks. It is clear that IDF must have known that these convoys were not a legitimate military target, as they either had asked the civilian population to leave (Marwaheen) or were present when the convoy left (Marjayoun). Even if there were Hezbollah members among the civilians who left the villages in convoys, this does not justify the attacks as they would be utterly disproportionate and beyond any concept of military necessity or the principle of distinction.