A/HRC/30/45 the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and to provide accountability for the source countries and redress for victims. 37. There are, in legal terms and in the context of international law, differences between the concepts of retorsion, retaliation and reprisals, even if the terminology is unsettled and sometimes fluctuant.20 In summary, retorsion refers to applying pressure on a target country, the latter being or not in breach of its international obligations, without the source country itself suspending any international obligation owed to the target country.21 Retaliation refers to the lex talionis, which demands that a wrongdoer be inflicted with the same injury as that which he has caused to another. It may thus be used to describe a suspension by a source country, by way of a unilateral coercive measure, of its international commitments selectively against the target country to an extent that is proportionate with the wrongful act of the latter, thus staying within the alleged bounds of legitimacy. Finally, the concept of reprisal, traditionally used to cover otherwise unlawful action, including forcible action, taken by way of self-help in response to a breach, is now mostly used to refer to action taken in time of international armed conflict. In that context, reprisals have been defined as “coercive measures which would normally be contrary to international law but which are taken in retaliation by one party to a conflict in order to stop the adversary from violating international law”.22 unilateral coercive measures can be implemented as an alternative, or as a prelude, to the use of force. They may be invoked for political motives or for reasons pertaining to human rights. It is recognized that they are not legitimate if they pursue an economic objective of the source country or group of countries. International law will only consider such measures as legitimate if: (a) they are a response to a breach of the international obligations of the target country; and (b) the breach of such obligations causes injury on a State or group of States giving them the right to retorsion/retaliation. The notion of extraterritorial source of injury giving rise to the right to retorsion/retaliation is clear for political or commercial disputes, but less so for claims of violations of human rights overseas. Be that as it may, the measures taken by the aggrieved State(s) might have been qualified as wrongful had it not been for the fact that they are a proportionate response to a breach of the international obligations by the target country. This legitimacy would also depend on the source countries having given due notice to the target country to have to comply with its international obligations. However, the legitimacy of retorsion/ retaliation may be put in doubt if the negative human rights impact of the unilateral coercive measures undermines basic human rights or if the measures are pursued indefinitely without any progress in achieving their proclaimed objective. Thus, human rights law mitigates the rigors of international law. 38. It may be ultimately that the preferred option to legitimize unilateral coercive measures is to apply to them the legal regime of countermeasures in the sense of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts,23 article 22 of which reads states that the wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State, as may be the case for unilateral coercive measures, “is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State”. However there are 20 21 22 23 See E.S. Colbert, Retaliation in International Law (New York, Kingʼs Crown Press, 1948), pp. 2 and 3, fn. 1. See “Commentaries on the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (2001) ILC Yearbook, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 128. See S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat”, Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 232, No. 476. See also S. Darcy, “Retaliation and Reprisals”, Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 879. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). 11