A/HRC/16/67 development and implementation of a database on prisoners - an important step forward to keep accurate records and prevent arbitrary detention, especially post-trial. 41. Many detainees lack meaningful access to defence counsel. There are not enough qualified lawyers or funded legal aid programmes to meet the demand of criminal cases. There is a need to identify realistic and innovative approaches to expanding legal aid and awareness for accused persons. Neither the legal aid department of the Ministry of Justice nor legal aid NGOs can meet the existing demand. 42. The current detention-related laws and policies used by national authorities and, to a lesser degree, international military forces, remain major causes for concern. Given the lack of a legal framework that complies with the obligations of Afghanistan under international human rights and humanitarian legal standards and national applicable law, the need for reform is urgent. In some cases, OHCHR/UNAMA has observed changes to existing policy or practice in the international military forces contingents with limited improvement in the overall situation of detention, particularly in cases of individuals held due to their suspected involvement in the conflict. Current ISAF counterinsurgency policies as set down in the 2006 ISAF Standard Operating Procedure on Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel, prescribes a 96-hour time limit for detaining persons in the conduct of military operations, after which time ISAF forces are required to either release or transfer detainees to Afghan authorities. Despite this 96-hour rule applying to all international military forces that are part of ISAF, several ISAF contributing countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada have introduced national caveats to the Standard Operating Procedure. These caveats prolong detention without proper due process and oversight from Afghan judicial authorities. 43. In addition, the de facto recipient of many of these detainees is the National Directorate of Security (NDS) which takes custody over individuals transferred either directly from ISAF or indirectly through the Afghan National Police or the Afghan National Army. Some ISAF countries have signed memorandums of understanding with the Government of Afghanistan regulating the transfer of detainees from their respective ISAF contingents and have obtained certain diplomatic assurances about the treatment of these detainees, including that no transferred detainee will be subject to the death penalty. It appears that the memorandums of understanding provide that the representatives of the relevant ISAF country, the AIHRC and the International Committee of the Red Cross have access to transferred detainees. 44. Limited information is available from the Afghan authorities on the conditions and treatment of detainees transferred by ISAF to the Afghan authorities, in particular to NDS. Reliance on this institution, in particular is of concern, as NDS continues to operate without an explicit, public legal framework stipulating its powers of investigation, arrest, and detention. The operational rules and procedures of NDS regulating detention facilities under its control are classified and are not available to the public, defence counsel or detainees. 45. In September, OHCHR/UNAMA began to implement a country-wide detention monitoring and advocacy project on the conditions of confinement and respect for judicial guarantees for detainees. This initiative examined fair trial guarantees to and humane treatment of general pretrial detainees and NDS detainees. 46. NDS continues to operate detention facilities where detainees are held for substantial periods of time without access to either relatives or defence counsel, sometimes resulting in these detentions becoming incommunicado. Many detainees reported forced confessions or having signed or thumb printed papers that they could not read or understand. The same documents were used later as evidence against them before courts. NDS also sometimes 13