A/HRC/11/41 page 13 39. With respect to the former, the Special Rapporteur consistently insisted that the judiciary needs to be effectively involved in the drafting of its budget.46 He notes that there exist different traditions and practices in this connection. In some Member States, the judiciary proposes its draft budget directly to the executive body in charge of finances; in other cases the budgetary allocations are submitted indirectly through the executive body in charge of judicial affairs. In other States, the courts make their proposals directly. The Special Rapporteur highlights that, where it exists, the independent body responsible for the judiciary47 should be vested with the role of receiving proposals from the courts, preparing a consolidated draft for the judicial budget and presenting it to the legislature. 40. The Special Rapporteur commends those Member States which have established a further safeguard for the active involvement of the judiciary: the right of the judiciary to participate in the deliberations of the budget in the legislature. 41. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur attaches great importance to safeguards established to ensure that the amount of the budget resources allocated to fund the courts in the current fiscal year or subject to be allocated for the next financial year may be reduced solely with the consent of the judiciary or a body representing it.48 He underlines that a reduction of the courts’ budget significantly hampers the administration of justice. As a result, unjustified long delays occur in the appointment of judges and some Member States resort to the appointment of provisional judges.49 42. The second issue, as mentioned above, is the management and administration of the budget allocated to the courts. The Special Rapporteur notes that in some Member States this task is entrusted to the judiciary or an independent authority responsible for the judiciary, while in others it is undertaken by a governmental body. Mixed systems also exist, in which budgets of higher or highest level courts are administered by themselves and the budget for the remaining courts by a special department of the executive.50 43. The Special Rapporteur would like to emphasize that, in his opinion, entrusting the administration of funds directly to the judiciary or an independent body responsible for the judiciary is much more likely to reinforce the independence of the judiciary,51 particularly in times of transition and/or tensions between the judicial and executive branches. Hence, he has 46 See also Principles and Guidelines in Africa (footnote 8), A (4) (v) (2). 47 See above paras. 27-30. 48 A/HRC/11/41/Add.2, para. 81. 49 This is currently the case in Argentina. 50 E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.3, para. 19. 51 E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.2, para. 26; E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.3, para. 82; E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.4, para. 90.