A/HRC/45/13/Add.3 impartial investigations; prohibits any measures taken to curtail or impede investigations (art. 13 (1));28 and establishes a set of related requirements (arts. 16 (1), (2) and (4)). 37. Persons accused of having committed acts of enforced disappearance must be suspended from any official duty so as to prevent any interference with the investigation and to protect those involved in the investigation from ill-treatment, intimidation or reprisals. 29 In order to help prevent institutional or internal solidarity from obstructing investigations, the proceedings should be conducted by institutions other than or separate from those where the suspects work or with which they are affiliated.30 38. States should consider establishing investigative teams that can work in a competent, independent and autonomous manner,31 with no relation with any authorities that might have an interest in hindering the investigations. This would be particularly important in contexts where acts of enforced disappearance are recurring or systematic. It should be stressed that the teams in charge of the investigations must be impartial and act at all times without bias and analyse objectively all the evidence, considering and appropriately pursuing both exculpatory and incriminatory evidence.32 39. In order to strengthen the independence of the criminal investigation, prosecution and adjudication, measures should be taken to ensure that judicial investigators cannot be removed during their terms in office,33 and that they are equipped with privileges to help ensure their protection.34 However, these measures aimed at ensuring independence and autonomy should not become an impediment to transparency and accountability, especially vis-à-vis the victims and their families.35 40. Regarding trials and judicial proceedings, the Declaration sets forth that the accused should only be tried by competent ordinary courts and not by other special tribunals, in particular military courts or those of national security agencies.36 The experience of the Working Group has shown that under certain circumstances, some States, such as those in post-conflict situations or States transitioning to democracy, should consider extending the prohibition of trial by any special tribunal, including a military tribunal, to include pretrial 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 8 See also art. 12 (1) of the International Convention. Declaration, art. 16 (1); and the International Convention, art. 12 (4). CED/C/MEX/CO/1, para. 28 (d); art. 12 (4) of the International Convention. When it legally implemented the three international instruments for the protection against enforced disappearance (through its Act 26.679), Argentina added a generic article 194 bis to its Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the judge will remove the law enforcement officials who conduct investigations, either ex officio or per a party’s request, in instances where there are grounds to believe that those officials may be involved in the events under investigation, even in cases in which it is mere suspicion. See also A/61/311, paras. 49–54; and Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), para. 28. See Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment: Istanbul Protocol (United Nations publication, Sales No. Sales No. E.04.XIV.3), paras. 85 and 108; and E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, principle 7. Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), para. 31. The Working Group notes a good practice in Mexico, where an interdisciplinary group of independent experts (GIEI) was established to conduct the investigation of enforced disappearance of 43 students of Ayotzinapa School in Iguala, Mexico. The GIEI investigation opened new lines of investigations that had been ignored by the prosecution and unveiled serious irregularities, such as the covering up of evidence and a false depiction of the facts, including facts in relation to the alleged torture of several defendants. See GIEI, Metodologías de investigación, búsqueda y atención a las víctimas: del caso Ayotzinapa a nuevos mecanismos en la lucha contra la impunidad (Editorial Temis, Bogotá), 2017 (in Spanish). Except on grounds of incapacity or behaviour rendering them unfit to discharge their duties, and pursuant to procedures ensuring due process and the participation of the victims. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, principles 7 (a) and (b). Fundación para la Justicia y el Estado Democrático de Derecho, “Estándares internacionales sobre la autonomía de los fiscales y las fiscalías” (Mexico City, 2017), p. 16 (in Spanish). Declaration, art. 16 (2). See also Committee on Enforced Disappearance, “Statement on enforced disappearance and military jurisdiction”, para. 3. The position that no role or intervention should be given to the armed forces in the prosecution and trial of enforced disappearances has been reiterated by the Working Group in a number of country visit reports, for instance, A/HRC/39/46/Add.1, para. 54. See also Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, art. IX.