A/HRC/8/7* page 29 239. Switzerland reiterated its view that most obligations under the Covenant were of a programmatic nature and were not justiciable within its legal order. It could only support an à la carte approach, which would allow more States to ratify the protocol. Switzerland was satisfied that article 5 did not refer to the voluntary nature of interim measures. It regretted the opt-in approach in articles 10 and 11, having preferred the opt-out option. It expressed reservations about the reference to a trust fund in article 14, noting the risk of duplicating existing development funds. 240. Germany could agree to the draft only on a preliminary basis, pending further examination. It understood that the word “may” in article 4 implied that it was the prerogative of the Committee to decide whether it would make use of this provision, and that article 8, paragraph 4 did not diminish the scope of examination or protection of victims. Germany accepted the wish of the majority to establish a trust fund in article 14, paragraph 3. It did not see a real need for such fund, regretted the absence of a victims-related component and would not accept the trust fund being used to reward those violating their obligations. It interpreted the term “States parties” as recipients under article 14, paragraph 3, in a broad sense, covering Governments, non-governmental organizations and other civil society organizations. 241. Mexico welcomed the final draft, noting that the text reflected a compromise. It would have preferred not to include article 4 in the protocol and stated that article 8, paragraph 4 should be interpreted in line with the provisions of the Covenant. 242. Croatia noted that not all delegates could be fully satisfied with the text as it reflected a compromise. It looked forward to the adoption of the protocol by the Council and the General Assembly. 243. Brazil welcomed the draft and reiterated that the protocol should cover all rights of the Covenant. An à la carte approach would have been a retrogression, not in keeping with other United Nations procedures and the principles of universality, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights. It expected that it would be possible to adopt the protocol in 2008. 244. Senegal noted the objectives of the optional protocol were to provide relief to victims and to ensure freedom from poverty. The adoption of the protocol was only the first step. What was needed now was its widest possible ratification. 245. Pakistan expressed reservations to the exclusion of Part I of the Covenant, noting that it did not favour artificial distinctions between Covenant rights. If specificity had led to a deadlock, then generality might be a way out; article 2 should either be kept general or specify all parts of the Covenant. Pakistan reiterated that the draft did not enjoy the support of all States. It would remain constructively engaged in negotiation prior to the session of the Council to find a solution acceptable to all. 246. The United Kingdom reserved its position on the draft. It remained sceptical about the practical benefits of the protocol, considering that economic, social and cultural rights did not lend themselves to adjudication in the same way as civil and political rights. It favoured