A/HRC/33/42 103. Host States must comply with their duty to regulate in relation to indigenous peoples’ rights to: (a) Lands, territories and resources, necessitating demarcation based on customary land tenure, possession and use; (b) Restitution of land, territories and resources taken without free, prior and informed consent; (c) Self-determination, by virtue of which they can determine their own social, cultural and economic development and maintain and develop their institutions, customs and decision-making processes; (d) Good-faith prior consultation to give or withhold free, prior and informed consent in relation to measures affecting their rights; (e) Their beliefs and traditional knowledge; (f) A permanent and enduring way of life of their own choosing. 104. Governmental bodies responsible for protecting indigenous peoples’ rights should ensure that information is made available to foreign investors addressing the need to respect indigenous peoples’ rights and the State’s obligation to progressively realize those rights. 105. Indigenous peoples could consider publicly declaring their expectations with regard to any potential investment projects in their territories, for example, through consultation and free, prior and informed consent protocols, thereby influencing potential investor’s legitimate expectations. 106. International financial institutions, including the World Bank, must implement their performance standards in a manner consistent with developments in international human rights law standards, including in relation to the requirement for free, prior and informed consent. 107. In order to suspend or terminate an international investment agreement that affects indigenous peoples’ rights, States could invoke article 62 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties in relation to a fundamental change in circumstances, such as the recognition of indigenous peoples within their borders. To do so, they would need to show that: (a) such recognition was not foreseen when the agreement was entered into, which could be explained by the evolving understanding of States in Asia and Africa as to what constitutes an indigenous people in those regions; (b) the change radically transforms the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty, as could be the case given the requirement to obtain indigenous peoples’ free, prior and informed consent to investment plans; and (c) the change is not the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty, a threshold that is not met by the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights within the host State. Long-term reform 108. Longer-term reform of international investment law necessitates a shift in thinking about the purpose and nature of international investment agreements and dispute resolution mechanisms. Rather than viewing their role as purely, or even perhaps primarily, to protect investor rights, they need to be understood within a broader public policy and the international law framework, commensurate with our stage of economic globalization and interdependence, such that legitimate investor protections work in harmony with indigenous and human rights rather than acting as a constraint upon long-term public policy objectives and serving to further fragment 23