A/HRC/24/38 financed by public funds, that will gradually replace the bureaucratic/administrative government branches now in charge of those issues. existing 308. This special jurisdiction, in his view, should have four distinct specialized branches (permanent and with adequate professional staffing): (i) an advisory conflict-resolution body to which all disputes, including those relating to treaty implementation, arising between indigenous peoples and nonindigenous individuals, entities and institutions (including government institutions) should be mandatorily submitted, and which should be empowered to encourage and conduct negotiations between the interested parties and to issue the recommendations considered pertinent to resolve the controversy; (ii) a body to draft, through negotiations with the indigenous peoples concerned: (a) new juridical bilateral, consensual, legal instruments with the indigenous peoples interested and (b) new legislation and other proposals to be submitted to the proper legislative and administrative government branches in order gradually to create a new institutionalized legal order applicable to all indigenous issues and that accords with the needs of indigenous peoples; (iii) a judicial collegiate body, to which all cases that after a reasonable period of time have not been resolved through the recommendations of the advisory body, should be mandatorily submitted. Such a body should be empowered to adjudicate these cases and should be capable of making its final decisions enforceable by making use of the coercive power of the State; (iv) an administrative branch in charge of all logistical aspects of indigenous/nonindigenous relations. 309. The Special Rapporteur is fully aware of many of the obstacles that such an innovative, far-reaching approach might encounter. To mention only one, it is not difficult to appreciate the many vested interests that might be affected by the redundancy of the structures now existing to deal with indigenous issues in many countries. Only strong political determination, particularly on the part of the leadership of the non-indigenous sector of the society, can make this approach viable. One other essential element is also clear: the effective participation of indigenous peoples - preferably on a basis of equality with non-indigenous people - in all four of the recommended branches is absolutely central to the "philosophy" presiding over the Special Rapporteur's overall approach to this question. 310. It is obvious that the above is a mere sketch of the new institutionality recommended. Much lies ahead in terms of filling in its quite visible lacunae. While the Special Rapporteur does not lack ideas on how to fill some of the gaps, he has considered it wise to allow for the required fine-tuning to be done at a later stage, around a negotiating table, by the interested parties themselves in the different countries. The way in which such a negotiation process is organized and conducted may well be the true litmus test eventually of the merits of his recommendation and of the viability of the structure proposed in a given socio-political context. 311. In advancing the recommendations set forth above, the Special Rapporteur has benefited from the highly interesting ideas on the same subject formulated in the final report (1996) of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples established by the Government of Canada. (71) 312. While it is generally held that contentious issues arising from treaties or constructive arrangements involving indigenous peoples should be discussed in the domestic realm, the international dimension of the treaty nevertheless warrants proper consideration. 41