A/HRC/34/64 9. The encirclement and siege of eastern Aleppo by pro-Government forces in July presaged further escalation of hostilities although the cessation of hostilities agreement of 9 September 2016, reached among the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group, provided civilians much-needed respite from violence. The collapse of that agreement on 19 September was followed by a prolonged and intense Syrian and Russian aerial campaign over eastern Aleppo and a resumption of shelling by armed groups on western Aleppo. In October, a high-level meeting in Lausanne, attended by representatives of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and influential regional powers failed to renew the agreement. 10. In November, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General called for an immediate pause in fighting and for the terrorist group Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra) to leave Aleppo city in order to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to the besieged area. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic rejected the Special Envoy’s proposal for local administrations in eastern Aleppo to be kept intact, and a pause in fighting did not materialize. 11. The recapture of eastern Aleppo city by pro-Government forces on 22 December 2016 had an impact on conflict dynamics countrywide. While the ceasefire declared on 29 December 2016 succeeded in reducing levels of violence and was generally holding at the time of writing, it could introduce new dynamics affecting developments on the ground. The Russian Federation and Turkey are mediating talks in Astana between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and opposition military representatives, where the Special Envoy will be present. A delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran will also attend. The Astana talks are intended to reinforce the countrywide ceasefire, reach an agreement on humanitarian assistance to besieged areas, and set the grounds for talks facilitated by the United Nations- and scheduled to be held in February 2017 in Geneva. IV. Weaponry and capabilities of warring parties 12. Warring parties had varied capabilities, a fact that helped in the attribution of responsibility for specific incidents. The types of weapons and how they were used was also indicative of strategy and intent. The choices of methods and means of combat selected by warring parties in Aleppo governorate overall suggest a wilful disregard by all sides for international humanitarian law rules with regard to proportionality and distinction, or for the requirement to take all feasible precautions to avoid incidental loss of human life, injury or damage to civilian objects. 13. Throughout the period under review, the skies over Aleppo city and its environs were jointly controlled by Syrian and Russian air forces. The Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic use predominantly the same aircraft and weapons, thus rendering attribution impossible in many cases. Although the international coalition also operated over Aleppo city, it did not conduct any offensive missions during the period under review. Armed groups lacked manned aircraft and were incapable of conducting conventional air strikes. While they did operate unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), only a handful were armed, and the majority failed to operate as intended. 14. Syrian and Russian air forces conducted daily air strikes in Aleppo throughout most of the period under review, exclusively employing, as far as the Commission could determine, unguided air-delivered munitions. These included aerial bombs, air-to-surface rockets, cluster munitions, incendiary bombs and improvised air-delivered munitions (barrel bombs), and weapons delivering toxic industrial chemicals, including chlorine. The Syrian air force has limited capability to conduct operations at night; most night operations were therefore conducted by the more capable Russian air force. The main airbases 5