A/HRC/42/CRP.5 Other activities in the context of hostilities 488. According to the 2019 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, the United Nations verified that seven children had been recruited and another 64 had been used by the Tatmadaw in 2018.1135 The same report notes: Though efforts are under way, full compliance is yet to be achieved and aggravated cases of new recruitment occurred in 2018, with no progress on accountability. However, 75 children and young people recruited as children were released from the Tatmadaw in 2018 and there has been steady progress in addressing the backlog of cases from previous years.1136 489. The Mission also received several consistent accounts indicating that Tatmadaw soldiers continued to use civilian houses, schools and places of worship as temporary bases.1137 Information received by the Mission in relation to previously identified patterns of Tatmadaw presence in civilian populated areas in northern Shan suggests that in some areas the Tatmadaw intentionally located military objectives in or near civilian populated areas to reduce the likelihood of attacks by EAOs. 1138 The Mission received reports that in Kachin State a hospital was used as a military base for several days, impairing the local population’s access to it.1139 The Mission received accounts of instances where Tatmadaw soldiers used civilian houses to conduct interrogations of suspected EAO members. 1140 490. The Mission received many reports that the Tatmadaw continued to threaten, intimidate and harass civilians and extort civilian property during the reporting period, including in the civilians’ houses and at checkpoints on main roads used by civilians. 1141 For example, in March 2019, in Kuktai Township, Shan State, Tatmadaw soldiers affiliated with the 99th LID stopped a civilian bus and demanded some 300,000 Kyat (approx. 200 USD) from its passengers, threatening to burn the vehicle if they failed to provide them with the money.1142 Information received by the Mission indicates that such conduct, compounded by increased militarization,1143 resulted in civilians being frightened of moving between villages and restricted their movement in contested areas, including when needing access to essential medical assistance for conflict-related injuries.1144 For example, a civilian woman who was shot and injured during fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA in Shan State in 2018 told the Mission that she reached a health care facility 11 hours after she was shot even though the hospital was only two hours away.1145 She explained that she was too frightened to travel to the hospital before nightfall due to the presence of Tatmadaw checkpoints on the way.1146 Conclusions and legal findings 491. The Mission identified the Tatmadaw’s February 2019 attack in Shan State as requiring further investigation to determine whether the military failed to take precautionary measures, including failing to do everything feasible to verify that targets 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 136 A/73/907–S/2019/509 para 126. A/73/907–S/2019/509 para 136. GI-009, 1078, GI-034, GI-035, GI-048, GI-056, GI-057, GI-058, PI-166, PI-168, V-380; See also A/73/907–S/2019/509 para 131. GI-023. FFFGEN-1-83712. 1078, GI-34, GI-35. FFFGEN-1555826851-6767, V-352, rows 12.12.18 and 25.05.18 of 2143, GI-020, GI-021, GI-35 and 34, GI-045, V-347, Rows 196, 180, 73, 29, 44, 45, 173, 117 of FFFGEN-1-85769, V-378, V-387, V388, V-389, and V-390. 1336, 1337. V-352. GI-009, 1335, 1414. 1335. 1335.