A/HRC/42/CRP.5 group. Up until 2014, the group was largely located in Kachin State, in Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) controlled territory, where it continues to maintain its headquarters. From 2015, groups of AA fighters slowly started to move into Paletwa Township, Chin State. By 2018, they had started taking up positions in remote parts of northern Rakhine State.585 262. The AA has military and political wings.586 The military wing is organized hierarchically. Twan Mrat Naing, who has the overall decision-making authority for the group. He is based in Kachin State at the AA headquarters in Laiza.587 AA fighters wear military style uniforms with badges showing their ranks,588 although in some circumstances fighters do not wear uniforms, especially when carrying out intelligence operations. 589 The political wing of the AA is the United League of Arakan (ULA). Some leaders of the ULA reside outside Myanmar and often represent the organization, including in political negotiations.590 263. Today, the AA, is estimated to have between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters, some of whom remain in Kachin State, but many of whom are now actively deployed in the active conflict areas of Rakhine and Chin States. 591 The AA may also have access to Bangladeshi territory due to the porous nature of the border.592 The AA’s sustained, sophisticated attacks on the military demonstrate the AA’s military capabilities and access to weaponry, which includes sniper rifles, light artillery and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).593 Credible reports indicate that much of their weaponry is obtained from other ethnic armed organisations in northern Myanmar.594 264. While attacks by the AA against the Tatmadaw have been taking place since 2015, the NLD decision in 2016 to nominate a NLD candidate for the position of Rakhine State Chief Minister, who was not favoured by the ruling Rakhine political party, coupled with the absence of visible improvements for Rakhine in the months after the NLD party took office, further drove the AA to pursue its goals through military means. 595 265. In January 2018, government security forces shot and killed seven ethnic Rakhine protesters in Mrauk-U Town.596 The impunity that followed, and the jailing of Rakhine 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 LI-187, LM-028, LM-049, LM-054. See also: The Irrawaddy, “The Causes and Likely Effects of the Arakan Army’s Attacks,” (12 January 2019); Angshuman Choudhury, “Decoding the Arakan Army: Emergence and Political Framing (Part-1),” (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 25 February 2019); International Crisis Group, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (January 2019). LI-187, DM-022, LM-022, LM-028, LM-035. LI-187, LM-022, LM-025, LM-028, Kyaw Linn, “‘Way of Rakhita’: dream or nightmare?” (Asia Times, 28 February 2019). CI-247, CI-248, CI-249, CI-250, CI-259, CI-314, LI-143, LI-145, LI-146, LI-148, LI-150, LI-153, LI156, LI-160, LI-161. CI-248, CI-249, CI-250, LI-187. LI-183, LM-022, LM-028, LM-035. LM-028, LM- 049, Anthony Davis, “Why Myanmar is losing the Rakhine War” (Asia Times, 2 July 2019); Amnesty International, No one Can Protect Us: War Crimes and Abuses in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, (May 2019), p. 12; International Crisis Group, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (January 2019). The Eurasia Review, “Arakan Army: Myanmar’s New Front of Conflict – Analysis” (14 July 2019); The Irrawaddy, “The Causes and Likely Effects of the Arakan Army’s Attacks” (12 January 2019). LI-187, LM-028, LM-049; The Irrawaddy, “Analysis: Arakan Army - A Powerful New Threat to the Tatmadaw” (8 January 2019); International Crisis Group, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (January 2019), p. 6. For a definition of EIDs, see Landmines, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war. LI-187, LM-028, LM-049, LM-054, The Irrawaddy, “Analysis: Arakan Army - A Powerful New Threat to the Tatmadaw” (8 January 2019); The Eurasia Review, “Arakan Army: Myanmar’s New Front of Conflict – Analysis” (14 July 2019). International Crisis Group, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (January 2019), p. 6; Angshuman Choudhury, “Decoding the Arakan Army: Emergence and Political Framing (Part-1),” (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 25 February 2019). A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras 444 – 453. 83