A/HRC/39/54 channels to cases of broad life-threatening situations, as provided for in article 10 of the code of conduct. Whenever the Special Rapporteur has had a possibility to engage constructively with a source or a target country or both, he has opted for quiet diplomacy and for promoting consensus, as was the case for the lifting of sanctions on the Sudan. In that instance, joint engagement with the parties through quiet diplomacy by the Independent Expert on the Sudan and the Special Rapporteur achieved the desired objective. The Sudanese authorities have in effect acknowledged the role of the two special procedure mandate holders in the successful outcome of the process that led to the lifting of sanctions from the Sudan. That approach has had the effect of improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups in the Sudan. 49. The Special Rapporteur believes that this is the most productive way to engage with his mandate and will continue to pursue the approach of building bridges rather than fuelling tension between sources and targets of sanctions, to the best of his ability. That approach is being pursued without letting up on the effort to promote awareness of the undercurrent of a tremendous expansion of unilateral sanctions through setting up and keeping a United Nations register of such sanctions. The attention of the mandate will also remain focused on initiatives to introduce, reassert and expand on potential legal instruments, tools or guidelines that can protect innocent victims from the adverse human rights impact of sanctions. The preferred option for that purpose is to adhere to the channels of the institutional framework of the United Nations rather than consider the mission of the mandate accomplished by the issuance of a press communiqué. A special representative on unilateral coercive measures 50. The Secretary-General of the United Nations should consider appointing one or more special representatives on unilateral coercive measures, each in charge of a specific country sanctions regime, as appropriate. That would be a very strong signal of the engagement of the United Nations system with the ongoing efforts to limit and ultimately abolish the use of unilateral coercive measures, as the only legitimate use of sanctions arises from measures applied by the Security Council through Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The mandate of a special representative on unilateral sanctions could encompass advocacy for the respect of international law in matters related to unilateral coercive measures, the negotiation of relief measures, alleviation of the most indiscriminate measures and ultimately promotion of a consensus on a case-by-case basis for the removal of unilateral sanctions. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that those issues extend beyond his mandate, which is focused on the protection of human rights affected by sanctions. The Special Rapporteur could interact with the special representative(s) on sanctions, as appropriate. VI. Conclusions and recommendations 51. The objective of the mandate is to promote the rule of law to the international community, with a view to eliminating economic coercion as a tool of international diplomacy. To that end, the Special Rapporteur notes with appreciation the efforts made by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Qatar to challenge the legality of the use of unilateral coercive measures through international adjudication. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his suggestion to Member States to request the renewal of the work of the International Law Commission on “extraterritorial jurisdiction” that was initiated in 2006 (see A/61/10, annex E, and A/72/370, para. 58). The Commission could be called upon to elaborate, inter alia, on the legal status and consequences of sanctions involving the unlawful assertion of jurisdiction by a source State or group of States over target States and a fortiori on third States. It is recalled in that respect that, under article 17 of its statute, the Commission shall consider proposals and draft multilateral conventions submitted by Member States, the principal organs of the United Nations other than the General Assembly, specialized agencies or official bodies established by intergovernmental agreement to encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification, and transmitted to it for that purpose by the Secretary-General. 16