A/HRC/44/38 26. The use of drones for the purpose of killing extraterritorially raises questions of morality, jurisdiction and accountability. With regard to the former, the International Court of Justice64 and the European Court of Human Rights,65 among others, have established that human rights treaty obligations can apply in principle to the conduct of a State outside its territory.66 The Human Rights Committee has established that a State party has an obligation to respect and to ensure the right to life of all persons whose right to life has been affected by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner. 67 That scenario applies to drone strikes and their targets, who should be considered to fall within the jurisdiction of the State operating the drone. 27. Judicial practice is not, however, yet in synch with these normative arguments. Thus far, courts have refused to oversee the use of drones to carry out targeted killings extraterritorially, arguing that such matters are political or relate to international relations between States and are therefore non-justiciable.68 A blanket denial of justiciability over the extraterritorial use of lethal force cannot be reconciled with recognized principles of international law, treaties, conventions and protocols, and violates the rights to life and to a remedy. 28. There are notable and recent exceptions to this state of affairs, which may augur a stronger legal response to the use of drones in acts of force. A watershed ruling is that of Rhine-Westphalia Higher Administrative Court on the legal responsibilities of Germany as the host of United States drone operations originating at Ramstein air base. As at the time of writing the present report, the implication of the ruling in terms of precedent-setting is uncertain, but its findings are crucial: (a) Germany has jurisdiction over a drone strike conducted by the United States by virtue of the assistance it provides and the central role it plays in United States strikes. In other words, Germany has a duty to protect the right to life of those targeted; (b) There is no basis in international law for preventive self-defence; (c) Germany should make greater efforts to ensure respect for international law in United States military operations involving German territory (Ramstein airbase); (d) United States assurances regarding the legality of activities undertaken through Ramstein airbase are insufficient; (e) The provision of assistance to unlawful United States strikes is a matter of law, not politics, and thus cannot be justified through foreign policy alone. 29. Protecting lives – the highest State responsibility – lies at the heart of a State’s authority to use force. Given the gravity of the acts and their consequences, effective parliamentary and judicial mechanisms to oversee, review and/or approve a State’s use of lethal force, domestically and extraterritorially, should be established and enabled to keep pace with technological and weapons developments. Triggers for that oversight, and its scope, must evolve accordingly, including specifically where the line between combat and non-combat operations is blurred. 64 65 66 67 68 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, at para. 109. Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, application No. 55721/07, Grand Chamber judgment of 7 July 2011, paras. 106–186; Loizidou v. Turkey, application No. 15318/89, judgment of 23 March 1995; Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, application No. 48787/99, judgment of 8 July 2004, para. 392; Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, application No. 27021/08, Grand Chamber judgment of 7 July 2011. A/68/382 and Corr.1, para. 45. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, para. 63. See, for example, United Kingdom Court of Appeal, Noor Khan v. the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, judgment of 20 January 2014. 9