A/HRC/41/48 57. Existing standards for judges and prosecutors provide that they should not be isolated from the society in which they live and should remain generally free to engage in the extra-professional activities of their choice. However, since such activities may jeopardize the dignity of their office or even their independence and impartiality, a reasonable balance needs to be struck between the degree to which judges and prosecutors may be involved in society and the need for them to be, and to be seen as, independent and impartial in the discharge of their duties. In the last analysis, the question must always be asked whether, in the particular social context and in the eyes of a reasonable observer, a judge or prosecutor is engaged in an activity that could objectively compromise his or her independence or impartiality. 42 58. The European Court of Human Rights has only considered two complaints concerning the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly of judges or prosecutors. In both cases, the Court found a violation of the right because the restriction was not prescribed by law, and did not enter into the question of whether a judge’s membership of the Freemasons was compatible with the principle of judicial independence and impartiality (see para. 37 above). 59. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered the compatibility of restrictions on the right to freedom of association in the López Lone case (para. 186).43 It noted that the dismissal of three judges as a result of their participation in public protests against a coup d’état affected their membership in the Association of Judges for Democracy, since only judges and justices on active duty could be members of the Association, and constituted an undue restriction of the right to freedom of association of the applicants.44 60. The Commentary on the Bangalore Principles (paras. 127, 135, 167–168 and 176) contains useful guidance on the issue of judges’ membership in various organizations. A judge may be a member of a trade union or non-profit organization; however, there is no consensus at the international level on whether a judge has the right to be member of a political party (see paras. 65–75 below). Also, it would not be appropriate for a judge to hold membership in any organization that discriminates on the basis of race, religion, gender, national origin, ethnicity or sexual orientation, because such membership might give rise to the perception that the judge’s impartiality is impaired. 61. It is permissible for judges and prosecutors to participate in peaceful demonstrations to defend their professional interests (e.g., to advance and protect the conditions of service and salaries) or to protest against a reform of the justice system that may undermine the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers. 62. In cases where judges and prosecutors consider it a moral duty to speak, for example to express opposition to war or to demand action on environmental degradation, it is generally permissible for them to participate in peaceful demonstrations. 45 In the López Lone case (paras. 148, 153 and 174), the Inter-American Court considered that at times of grave democratic crises judges had not only the right but also the duty to speak up in favour of the restoration of democratic order, alone and in association with other judges, and that the norms that ordinarily restricted the right of judges to participate in politics were not applicable to their actions in defence of the rule of law. 63. The responses to the questionnaire show that in many countries judges and prosecutors have the right to create or join professional associations to protect the interests of their members and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and the right to form or join any other associations that do not detract from the dignity of their office, interfere with their official duties or otherwise cast doubts as to their independence and impartiality. However, national legislation generally provides that the right of peaceful assembly and association of judges and prosecutors may be subject to specific restrictions, 42 43 44 45 12 Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 3, paras. 27–28. López Lone et al. v. Honduras, para. 186. See also Escher et al. v. Brazil, judgment of 6 July 2009, para. 173. See UNODC, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles, para. 140.