A/HRC/14/26 H. The continuing education of judges as a means to strengthening the independence of the judiciary 63. As mentioned above, judges can and should play an active role in the implementation of the human rights obligations of the State. This may take several forms. One possibility is that the judge — while making his/her deliberations — discovers that there is a discrepancy between the national constitution, which enshrines human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the legislation, traditional law or directives, which may not yet have been adapted to the obligations undertaken by the State. Thus, while many constitutions proclaim the promotion and protection of human rights, domestic legislation is not always in line with this proclamation. When considering cases, judges may be in doubt as to the constitutionality of a certain domestic provision which will be decisive for the judgement to be made. In several Member States, judges are then able to refer the question of whether the legislative norm is constitutional to a higher domestic court. 64. In other instances, when the constitution and other legislation do not meet the human rights obligations of the State concerned or where there is a legal vacuum, judges themselves refer in their judgements to the international standards. Sometimes, they even refer to the case law of international or regional courts, quasi-judicial bodies, treaty bodies or special procedures or their advisory opinions or views, particularly human rights mechanisms at the United Nations, in order to underscore their decision, because of a lack of familiarity with these international institutions. In these instances, judges take a proactive role and help the State to meet the obligations the country has entered into. 65. In previous reports, the need for the establishment of various safeguards necessary to effectively guarantee the independence of judges33 and lawyers34 was examined. In this report, the Special Rapporteur would like to point to several circumstances that prevent judges and lawyers examining international human rights standards and applying them when deciding cases or defending a client before the court. 66. In the first scenario, judges and lawyers are aware that their State has entered into international human rights obligations through the ratification of treaties or otherwise. However, in some cases, the texts of the international treaties are not available to judges and lawyers. In other cases, it appears that while the text of the treaty is available, the relevant case law is not available to judges and lawyers or can only be obtained at considerable financial cost and difficulty. In some Member States, international human rights standards are cited in decisions of the highest judicial instance, which instruct the lower court judges to be guided by those standards. However, those decisions are not always available to lower-level courts or judges. These impediments were detected by the Special Rapporteur’s predecessors in a number of countries. 67. Furthermore, in some States, the information flow entering the country is so slight or restricted that judges and lawyers are not even sure which international human rights obligations the State has undertaken, or if it has done so. In such situations, criteria for judicial decisions are often developed specifically to prevent judges from referring to human rights standards in their decisions. While the cold war era is a vivid example of such circumstances, the Special Rapporteur notes that such conditions still exist in a considerable number of countries. 68. Finally, in some States judges and lawyers are well aware of international human rights standards applicable to their countries and even of relevant case law established by 33 34 14 See A/HRC/11/41, paras. 14–84. See A/64/181, paras. 10–69. GE.10-12622